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HOSTILE RESTRUCTURINGS
Diane Lourdes Dick*
Abstract: The conventional wisdom holds that out-of-court loan restructurings are mostly
consensual and collaborative. But this is no longer accurate. Highly aggressive,
nonconsensual restructuring transactions—what I call “hostile restructurings”—are becoming
a common feature of the capital markets. Relying on hypertechnical interpretations of loan
agreements, one increasingly popular hostile restructuring method involves issuing new debt
that enjoys higher priority than the existing debt; another involves transferring the most
valuable collateral away from existing lenders to secure new borrowing.
These transactions are distinguishable from normal out-of-court restructurings by their
use of coercive tactics to overcome not only the traditional minority lender holdout problem,
but also the collective bargaining power of the entire lender group. In other words, in hostile
restructurings, the goal of the negotiations is not simply to cram the restructuring down the
throats of a self-interested or misguided minority holdout; instead, the goal is to cram the
plan down on the entire lender group by pitting similarly situated lenders against one another.
Hostile restructurings not only strain normal interlender dynamics—they also challenge
traditional understandings of what it means to be a senior secured creditor. The ensuing
lender arms race has, in turn, carved new fault lines in chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.
Using detailed case studies, this Article is the first to explore both how these hostile
restructurings differ from the traditional interlender conflict dynamics and how they amplify
the distributional concerns that have traditionally plagued bankruptcy restructurings.
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INTRODUCTION
Financially distressed and overleveraged companies generally have
two options for restructuring their bank and non-bank private debt.1
Such companies can file for chapter 11 bankruptcy2 on either a
prearranged or “free fall” basis and seek judicial confirmation of a plan
of reorganization,3 or they can convince senior lenders to amend or
restate the loan agreement to give the debtor more breathing room.4 The
traditional wisdom holds that an out-of-court restructuring of this sort is
almost always more efficient because it avoids the costs and
uncertainties of a bankruptcy filing; however, it can be difficult to
achieve because it requires collaboration and consensus. After all, senior
lenders—who hold the highest priority claims against the company—
must agree to voluntarily impair their own bargained-for rights;

1. It is important to distinguish between bank and non-bank private debt, on the one hand, and
public securities (such as bonds) on the other, because the latter is subject to a far more extensive
legal and regulatory framework. For more on this distinction, see Jayant R. Kale & Costanza
Meneghetti, The Choice Between Public and Private Debt: A Survey, 23 IIMB MGMT. REV. 5
(2011).
2. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to
“establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Using
this authority, Congress has passed a series of bankruptcy laws, the most recent being the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the reorganization of
bankrupt persons. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174.
3. The chapter 11 plan of reorganization identifies, among other things, how various classes of
creditors and interest holders will be treated and what specific distributions will be made from the
bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129(a) (detailing plan confirmation requirements).
4. For a classic expression of this choice, see Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John & Larry H.P. Lang,
Troubled Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990).
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meanwhile, without the benefit of bankruptcy’s automatic stay,5 other
stakeholders, such as junior lenders, landlords, trade creditors, and
equity owners, may disrupt the restructuring by exercising their own
remedies against the debtor.
Making out-of-court restructurings more difficult is the fact that the
company’s senior lenders—particularly when they have liens on all or
substantially all of the company’s assets—exercise enormous bargaining
power in setting the terms of any potential restructuring. Senior lenders
will naturally prefer restructuring proposals that provide them the surest
and quickest recovery, even if it comes at the expense of the firm’s
future as a going concern.6
These preferences and power dynamics alone make it increasingly
difficult to achieve a meaningful consensual restructuring. But
complicating things further is the fact that big companies typically
obtain loans from large syndicates of lenders.7 And, even if most of the
lenders agree to the terms of an out-of-court restructuring, a minority of
lenders may refuse to make any concessions—either because they do not
believe the restructuring makes sense, or because they believe that by
holding out they can obtain a better deal.8 Depending on the consent
thresholds required for modifications to the company’s loan agreements,
these holdouts may derail the entire restructuring; at a minimum, they
will certainly make it more expensive.
In contrast, bankruptcy offers a legal framework to shift some
bargaining power to the debtor, neutralize the holdout risk, and provide a
limited pathway for nonconsensual restructurings.9 And, while
bankruptcy law provides a range of protections for secured creditors, it
also helps to recenter restructuring discussions around enhancing the
company’s long-term prospects as a going concern and maximizing the
5. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
6. “The term ‘going concern value’ refers to the value of assets held together and used in a
business operation. This value is typically contrasted against ‘liquidation value,’ which is generally
defined as the value of the assets, sold on a piecemeal basis, less the costs of sale.” Christopher W.
Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
89, 92 n.8 (1992).
7. A syndicated loan is typically arranged and administered by agents who serve on behalf of the
various bank and non-bank lenders. As the Second Circuit recently confirmed, syndicated loans are
not considered securities. See Kirschner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 17 Civ. 6334, 2020
WL 2614765, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020).
8. On the minority holdout problem in corporate restructurings, see infra notes 46–47 and
accompanying text.
9. So-called cramdowns are authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1), which provides that a plan
that satisfies all other requisite provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) may be confirmed over the
objection of one or more classes.
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potential recoveries of all stakeholders.
But despite these attractive features, bankruptcy is generally
perceived as a nuclear option—it can be expensive, time-consuming, and
it has profound implications for the firm’s entire capital structure.10 For
these reasons, the conventional wisdom surrounding private debt
modifications is that struggling companies must weigh the benefits of a
limited, imperfect, consensual out-of-court restructuring against the risks
and downsides that accompany a more holistic bankruptcy
reorganization.
But recent developments in the U.S. capital markets—namely, the rise
of what I call “hostile” out-of-court private loan restructurings11—have
upended this conventional wisdom. Financially distressed companies
increasingly use highly aggressive out-of-court restructuring
transactions—referred to by finance professionals as “liability
management transactions”12 or “lender-on-lender violence”13—to
10. I examine these and related perceptions of bankruptcy in Diane Lourdes Dick, Bankruptcy,
Bailout, or Bust: Early Corporate Responses to the Business and Financial Challenges of Covid-19,
40 BANKR. L. LETTER (Thompson Reuters, St. Paul, Minn.), July 2020, at 1, 7.
11. In corporate law, a “hostile takeover” occurs when a predator firm acquires control of a target
company despite resistance by the target’s management. For a classic discussion, see John C.
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender
Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
12. The term was used in a September 2020 program hosted by the highly influential Loan
Syndications and Trading Association. See Meyer Dworkin, Jason Kyrwood, Bridget Marsh, Brian
Resnick & Ken Steinberg, Recent Distressed Liability Management Transactions: Lessons for the
Loan Market, LSTA (Sept. 29, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.lsta.org/events/recent-distressedliability-management-transactions-lessons-for-the-loan-market (last visited Nov. 6, 2021)
[hereinafter LSTA Presentation].
13. Patrick D. Walling, Navigating the Club in Private Credit Deals, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 3,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/navigating-club-private-credit-deals [https://perma.cc/
YD7C-E65T] (observing that others have used the phrase). Like Walling, I only mention it in
passing to identify the subject of the Article. I avoid further uses of the phrase (along with its
variant, “creditor-on-creditor violence”) because of its similarity to—and possible derivation
from—the problematic term “Black-on-[B]lack violence.” See generally Alicia McElhaney,
‘Creditor-on-Creditor Violence’ Lands Big Managers in Court, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 20,
2020),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1pbjxp892zp1x/Creditor-on-CreditorViolence-Lands-Big-Managers-in-Court [https://perma.cc/J295-LDWH] (describing the trend of
“creditor-on-creditor violence”); Jo Ellen Fair, “Black-on-Black”: Race, Space, and News of
Africans and African Americans, 22 ISSUE: J. OP. 35, 35–37 (1994) (examining the “meaning of a
racial label, ‘black-on-black,’ as it is used in U.S. news stories to define and describe crime and
violence in the United States and South Africa”). The latter term has been used by some observers
to undermine demands for police reforms; as one commentator recently explained, “‘Black-on[B]lack crime’ is a frame that presupposes [B]lack criminality—that there’s something inherent to
[B]lackness which makes intra-group crime more prevalent and more deadly.” Jamelle Bouie, Why
“Black-on-Black Crime” Is a Dangerous Idea, AM. PROSPECT (July 17, 2013),
https://prospect.org/power/black-on-black-crime-dangerous-idea/ [https://perma.cc/5LRJ-QB8X]. In
light of these associations, the use of the term to describe corporate debt restructuring dynamics is
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achieve, in substance, the sort of senior loan modifications that they
previously could only achieve through a bankruptcy reorganization. And
in some cases, companies have been able to do things that they would
not even be allowed to do in bankruptcy.
Companies generally initiate hostile restructurings by carefully
reviewing their existing senior loan agreements—which are typically
hundreds of pages long—in search of provisions that technically allow
them to do things that arguably violate the spirit of the agreement. This
approach not only exploits the plain language of the contract—it also
exploits decades of statutory and judicial law directing courts to enforce
contracts and otherwise stay out of commercial disputes.14 Relying on
hypertechnical interpretations of loan agreements,15 one increasingly
popular hostile restructuring method involves issuing new debt that
enjoys higher priority than the existing debt; another involves
transferring the most valuable collateral away from existing lenders to
secure new borrowing.
A key feature of hostile restructurings is that the opportunity to
participate is made available only to certain lenders—usually the precise
number of lenders needed to satisfy the applicable consent thresholds in
the existing agreements. The other lenders often have no idea a deal is
even being negotiated; they may learn about it for the first time when
they read the company’s press release announcing the restructuring. And
the missed opportunity carries a high cost. Lenders who are not included
in the restructuring find that their rights have been economically
impaired. For instance, their debt may be subordinated to hundreds of
millions of dollars in new debt, or they may no longer have a meaningful
interest in the company’s most valuable collateral.
As one would expect, hostile restructurings have captured the
attention of capital market participants,16 their advisors,17 and even the
insensitive and unnecessary.
14. Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance
Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1465.
15. For instance, in one of the case studies profiled in this Article, the debtor company relied on
language in the loan agreement authorizing new extensions of credit under the facility in order to
issue debt purely for the purpose of meeting consent thresholds for major changes. See infra notes
213–223 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Sally Bakewell, Apollo’s Debt-Lawsuit Defeat to Reshape Wall Street Risk Models,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0709/apollo-s-debt-lawsuit-defeat-to-reshape-wall-street-risk-models (last visited Nov. 1, 2021)
(discussing a key case illustrating the rise of aggressive debt restructuring transactions); Matt Wirz,
Apollo Sues Serta Simmons and Owner Advent Over Debt Dispute, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2020,
6:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apollo-sues-serta-simmons-and-owner-advent-over-debtdispute-11591906294 (last visited Sept. 16, 2021) (exploring the use of “controversial maneuvers”
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influential trade association for the U.S. syndicated loan market, the
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA).18 These
transactions have prompted lawsuits in state court, federal district court,
and federal bankruptcy court, with plaintiffs alleging the same troubling
dynamics that prompted Congress—nearly a century ago—to severely
restrict out-of-court restructurings of publicly traded bond debt.
These hostile restructurings have strained normal interlender
dynamics while also challenging traditional understandings of what it
means to be a senior secured creditor. And, while some aspects of these
transactions may be thwarted by defensive drafting—such as more
restrictive covenants in the underlying loan agreements—savvy debtor
companies and their advisors may continue to design new hostile
restructurings that exploit other hypertechnical provisions in their loan
agreements. Whether it plays out ex ante or ex post, the ensuing lender
arms race has, in turn, carved new fault lines in corporate bankruptcy
proceedings. Indeed, recent chapter 11 cases suggest that it is becoming
more difficult to reach consensus among ever more fractured lender
groups, with minority lenders in some cases forming ad hoc groups to
oppose the restructuring and advance alternative transactions.19
As market participants and their advisors struggle to adjust to this
new world of hostile restructurings, the question for courts and
lawmakers is whether these transactions should be accepted as
innovative and competitive responses to corporate financial distress, or
as normative failures in the capital markets that require corrective legal
or regulatory action. Drawing insights from recent case studies,20 this
Article provides the first comprehensive academic treatment of hostile
restructurings. I show how hostile restructurings have the potential to
destroy value, impair the smooth functioning of the capital markets, and
introduce and amplify the distributional concerns that have traditionally
in recent debt restructurings).
17. Several major commercial law firms have hosted fascinating podcasts on the topic. See, e.g.,
The Cramdown Podcast, Lender on Lender Priming, O’MELVENY & MYERS, LLP (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/the-cramdown-restructuringpodcast-episode-4 [https://perma.cc/QAA3-TZFT] (offering lively discourse on the growing use of
aggressive debt restructuring maneuvers).
18. See LSTA Presentation, supra note 12.
19. See, e.g., Statement of the First Lien Minority Group Regarding the Debtors’ Sale Motion and
Limited Objection to Approval of the Disclosure Statement, In re J.C. Penney Co., No. 20-20182
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 4, 2020) (setting forth a group of minority lenders’ objections); see also
Andrew Scurria, J.C. Penney Lenders Trade Barbs Over Chapter 11 Split, WSJ PRO BANKR. (Oct.
26, 2020, 8:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-c-penney-lenders-trade-barbs-over-chapter-11split-11603759734 (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (discussing the interlender conflicts).
20. See infra Part II.
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plagued bankruptcy restructurings.21
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the conventional
wisdom of loan restructuring, focusing on out-of-court restructurings
and bankruptcy reorganizations under chapter 11. Part II challenges the
conventional wisdom by detailing the rise of hostile restructurings. This
Part draws from rich case studies of “uptiering” and “dropdown” style
hostile restructurings.22 Part III shifts from descriptive to normative,
arguing that hostile restructurings constitute a normative failure in the
capital markets. This is because they violate the most fundamental
norms and values underlying commercial law and practice. First, hostile
restructurings threaten the important goals of legal certainty and
predictability in the capital markets. Second, they violate classic and
emerging theoretical justifications for nonconsensual adjustments to loan
agreements. Finally, these transactions have the potential to interfere
with the smooth functioning of the capital markets, causing dangerous
ripple effects. Part IV explores a variety of prescriptive solutions to
correct the normative failure, ultimately settling on a recommendation
that courts should provide a more holistic, standards-based review of
hostile restructurings. Part V concludes.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OF LOAN
RESTRUCTURING

In commercial finance, the term “restructuring” refers to the process
by which firms substantially change their debt contracts.23 There are
many reasons why firms may choose to pursue loan restructurings.24 In
many cases, the restructuring is motivated by corporate financial
distress; in others, the restructuring is driven by the desire to seize some
opportunity that is currently prohibited by existing loan agreements.25
In practice, restructuring discussions tend to arise because the
company is in default of its commitments under the loan agreement. For
instance, most loan agreements require ongoing compliance with strict
financial covenants that test the firm’s condition and performance

21. See infra Part III.
22. These terms, which denote two popular methods of hostile restructuring, are used in the
LSTA Presentation, supra note 12.
23. STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: CASE
STUDIES IN BANKRUPTCIES, BUYOUTS, AND BREAKUPS 781 (2010) (building a similar definition
from the seminal corporate finance scholarship of Michael Jensen and William Meckling).
24. Id. at 781–82.
25. Id.
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against certain negotiated ratios and other metrics.26 Violations of these
covenants constitute events of default even if the company is current on
all required interest and principal payments. When a company is in
default, the lender has the right to exercise remedies against the
borrower, such as acceleration and collection and, in the case of secured
financing, repossession and foreclosure.27
Even in the face of severe financial or economic challenges, corporate
shareholders and managers will often prefer to restructure rather than
liquidate because it preserves their ongoing interest in (and control over)
the firm.28 But economically speaking, restructuring only makes sense if
the firm is worth saving as a going concern;29 otherwise, the firm should
be liquidated so that any remaining assets and investment capital can be
redeployed in more productive and profitable ways.30 If the firm has
greater value as a going concern, then a fair and efficient restructuring
has the potential to stabilize the distressed business and preserve or even
enhance the firm’s going concern value; this, in turn, has the added
benefit of advancing the economic interests of employees, shareholders,
and the countless suppliers, vendors, and other parties that conduct
business with the company.
Once controlling stakeholders decide to restructure, they may engage
in formal legal proceedings, such as chapter 11 bankruptcy, or out-ofcourt negotiations. What drives the choice between the two?31
Conventional wisdom holds that the main difference between out-ofcourt restructuring and bankruptcy restructuring is that the former
26. For a discussion of common financial covenants, see Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants
in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991).
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-601(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (“After default, a
secured party has the rights provided in this part and . . . those provided by agreement of the parties.
A secured party . . . may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim [or]
security interest . . . by any available judicial procedure . . . .”).
28. These preferences, and the failure of modern corporate law to properly restrain them, are
explored in Jared A. Ellias & Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745 (2020).
29. Douglas G. Baird, Priority Matters: Absolute Priority, Relative Priority, and the Costs of
Bankruptcy, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 789 (2017) (“When a firm has value as a going concern, the
investors as a group are better off if it remains intact even when it is in financial distress and not
able to pay all of its bills.”).
30. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 924 (2001).
31. A recent article explains that bankruptcy and out-of-court restructurings are not necessarily
opposing choices, but can be complementary choices; for instance, an initial out-of-court
restructuring can pave the way for a more efficient bankruptcy restructuring. See Jason Roderick
Donaldson, Edward R. Morrison, Giorgia Piacentino & Xiaobo Yu, Restructuring vs. Bankruptcy
34–36 (Colum. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 630, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=3698161 [https://perma.cc/X3CU-6WFF].

Lourdes-Dick (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 9:47 PM

HOSTILE RESTRUCTURINGS

1341

process is largely voluntary, consensual, and collaborative, reflecting a
shared vision to restructure out of court and avoid the increased risks and
costs associated with bankruptcy process. In contrast, bankruptcy—
while costly, risky, and often time-consuming—offers a legal framework
to neutralize certain obstacles that often prevent fair and efficient out-ofcourt restructurings, such as extreme imbalances in bargaining power,
senior lenders’ collective refusal to look beyond their own self-interest,
and the problem of minority holdouts. The following sections explore
the conventional wisdom in more detail, beginning with the classic
assumptions surrounding out-of-court restructurings.
A.

The Conventional Wisdom of Out-of-Court Restructurings

Also known as a “workout,”32 an out-of-court restructuring is a
negotiated settlement between the company and some or all of its
lenders outside of any formal, court-administered bankruptcy or
insolvency process. Because this Article is focused on private debt, an
out-of-court restructuring for these purposes means that lenders agree to
voluntarily impair their own bargained-for rights and enter into new
agreements with the debtor setting forth repayment and other terms.
Building on an earlier point, lenders should, in theory, agree to an
out-of-court restructuring only if they believe that the firm is worth more
as a going concern; if the lenders do not share this belief, they should
prefer liquidation in order to avoid the risk of further losses, retrieve
what remains of their investment, and deploy their capital elsewhere for
potentially greater returns.33 Senior lenders may realize their liquidation
preference by enforcing—or, in many cases, simply threatening to
enforce—their rights and remedies under the loan agreements, or, less
commonly, by pushing the company into an involuntary bankruptcy.
Of course, much of this assumes that stakeholders are able to quickly
ascertain the firm’s intrinsic value and make decisions based on these
dollar amounts. In reality, corporate valuation is a difficult and inexact
blend of art and science, and stakeholders often have widely divergent
views on the value of the company as a going concern. But assuming
stakeholders sufficiently agree on a value thesis, all stakeholders should
prefer the more flexible, less costly, and less invasive option of an outof-court restructuring.34
32. See, e.g., Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 347
(1993) (providing an overview of out-of-court restructurings).
33. See sources cited supra notes 29–30.
34. See Gilson et al., supra note 4, at 318.

Lourdes-Dick (Do Not Delete)

1342

12/14/2021 9:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1333

Many of these benefits of out-of-court restructurings can be traced to
a lack of regulatory or judicial oversight.35 Unlike other recapitalization
transactions, such as those involving public bond and equity securities,
out-of-court loan restructurings are not subject to any specialized legal
or regulatory regime. Instead, much like the relationship between a
debtor and its creditors generally, out-of-court restructurings are
properly analyzed under a patchwork of corporate, commercial, and
contract laws.36
As exercises in contract negotiation, restructurings are subject to the
terms of the existing loan agreements and to general state contract laws
that govern the interpretation of those agreements and the parties’ entry
into new agreements. Then, pursuant to a prevailing legal paradigm in
commercial law that promotes legal certainty, predictability, and
uniformity above virtually all other interests, courts have tended to
strictly enforce the plain language of whatever agreements may be
reached. Courts tend to avoid interposing thorny equitable doctrines or
judge-made law out of fear that they might interfere with the smooth
functioning of the capital markets.37
Out-of-court restructurings typically take the form of an extension, a
composition, or a debt-for-equity swap. An extension involves a
restructuring of the maturity date, the interest rate, and the amount and
timing of any required principal and/or interest payments.38 It may also
involve a restructuring of key nonmonetary terms, such as the debtor’s
obligation to comply with ongoing covenants or the presence and extent
of any credit enhancements, such as collateral or guarantees.39 A
35. I discuss the lack of regulatory or judicial oversight in commercial finance transactions in a
previous work. See generally Dick, supra note 14.
36. For a thoughtful exposition on the patchwork of laws governing debtor-creditor relations
generally, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1996). On the corporate laws setting forth the duties of corporate managers
in times of distress, see Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (2007).
37. See generally Dick, supra note 14.
38. The term “extension” may or may not be used in reference to the restructuring transaction.
For an example of a restructuring of this sort, see Great Plains Real Est. Dev., L.L.C. v. Union Cent.
Life Ins. Co., No. 4:05–CV–002204, 2007 WL 6908824, at *3 (S.D. Iowa June 4, 2007), noting
“[t]he Extension Agreement provided Great Plains with a lower interest rate and extended maturity
date, and obligated plaintiff to tender a one-time principal payment of $391,280.96.”
39. For instance, the Canadian company NFI Group Inc. recently engaged in an out-of-court
restructuring of its debt facility, relaxing covenants in order to give the company some much-needed
breathing room while recovering from a global pandemic. Press Release, NFI Group Inc., NFI
Group
Announces
Amendments
to
Its
Credit
Facilities
(Dec.
23,
2020),
https://www.nfigroup.com/2020/12/23/nfi-group-announces-amendments-to-its-credit-facilities/
[https://perma.cc/5KGB-SRMA].
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composition takes things even further, with lenders agreeing to
restructure not only the foregoing items but also the principal amount of
the debt.40 By agreeing to forgive some of the outstanding obligations,
lenders allow the debtor to deleverage its balance sheet.
In contrast, a debt-for-equity swap occurs when lenders agree to
surrender all or part of their debt claims in exchange for equity in the
firm.41 This can help the company achieve full deleveraging; however, it
also dilutes existing equity interests, forcing them to share the future
upside potential with stakeholders who previously held only a fixed
claim on the assets of the firm. Finally, parties to out-of-court
restructurings may blend these approaches, resulting in creative hybrid
solutions to corporate financial distress.42
Regardless of the approach used, the conventional wisdom is that outof-court restructurings require collaboration and consensus among the
company, its senior lenders, and other stakeholders that must consent to
the restructuring.43 After all, these are voluntary agreements to deviate
from bargained-for rights. And this is where things begin to break down
in practice.44 Big companies typically borrow from large groups of
40. The term “composition” is somewhat antiquated and is more likely to appear in older cases
and commentary. See, e.g., Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Blake, 37 N.E. 519, 519 (N.Y. 1894) (describing
a classic composition agreement).
41. For a critical examination of debt-for-equity swaps, see Jongho Kim, To Be Creditor or to Be
Shareholder, That Is the Question: Is the Debt-for-Equity Swap Creditors’ Financial Suicide?, 10 J.
BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 359 (2017).
42. Companies also increasingly use other transactions to complete out-of-court restructurings,
such as assignments for the benefit of creditors and Article 9 foreclosure sales under the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Jim Fleet, Chapter 11 on Decline? Changes Are Here to Stay, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Mar. 2012, at 16.
43. This conventional wisdom is reflected in decades of judicial decisions, scholarly articles,
books, and treatises. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating
Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REV. 205, 215 (2014) (“An out-of-court restructuring typically
involves a consensual agreement between the company and its major creditors to adjust the
company’s capital structure.”); PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 461 (5th ed. 2014) (referring to out-of-court restructurings as “voluntary” and
“negotiated”); In re Chateaugay Corp., 961 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A debtor in financial
trouble may seek to avoid bankruptcy through a consensual out-of-court workout.”).
44. Describing the somewhat analogous world of bond workouts, Professors Bratton and Levitin
described these dynamics thusly:
When a company is in financial distress, its stockholders and bondholders have every reason to
negotiate a restructuring (or “workout”) of its obligations to produce a sustainable capital
structure and avoid the costs of a bankruptcy. The reality is different. Bondholders hold out and
free ride in response to restructuring offers from distressed debtors. Debtors respond with
coercive inducements and procedural maneuvers. The result is a destabilizing and potentially
toxic mix of creditor opportunism and debtor coercion that can derail the workout process,
forcing a bankruptcy restructuring.
William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, The New Bond Workouts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1600
(2018).
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syndicated lenders.45 These groups—particularly when they enjoy a
senior secured position in the company’s capital structure—exercise
enormous bargaining power in setting the terms of any potential
restructuring. For instance, if the liquidation value is sufficient to pay the
senior lenders in full, they may prefer an immediate liquidation of the
firm to reduce any further risk of loss. This is true even if the firm has
greater value as a going concern.
Moreover, even if most lenders believe that a consensual restructuring
makes sense, some may refuse to make concessions in the hopes of
using their bargaining power to obtain a better deal, either for
themselves or for the entire group. If the loan agreement requires
unanimous consent to any modifications, these holdouts may derail the
entire restructuring; at a minimum, they will certainly make it more
expensive.46 Accordingly, even when all or most stakeholders agree in
theory that the firm should be restructured, it may still wind up in
bankruptcy for lack of consensus.47
In recent years, in order to help facilitate out-of-court restructurings,
many commercial loan agreements have included collective action
clauses48 that allow restructurings with less-than-unanimous consent;
this helps to prevent opportunistic holdups by lenders holding relatively
small amounts of debt. For instance, loan agreements commonly allow
modifications to the agreement with majority or supermajority lender
consent.49 Such provisions are presumably based on an assumption that
consent rights will be exercised by lenders organized around a common
desire to advance the economic interests of all similarly situated lenders.
This shared economic interest is, in essence, the theoretical justification

45. Syndicated loans are described in BLAISE GANGUIN & JOHN BILARDELLO, FUNDAMENTALS
CORPORATE CREDIT ANALYSIS 161–63 (2005). For a classic practice-oriented treatise on
syndicated loan agreements, see RICHARD WIGHT, WARREN COOKE & RICHARD GRAY, THE
LSTA’S COMPLETE CREDIT AGREEMENT GUIDE (2009).
46. The holdout problem is richly explored in the context of bond debt securities in Marcel
Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040 (2002). See also Donaldson et al., supra note 31.
47. See Gilson et al., supra note 4, at 20.
48. Collective action clauses in the parallel world of sovereign debt are the subject of a rich body
of academic literature. See, e.g., Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
Statutory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483 (2004) (considering the role of
collective action clauses in sovereign debt restructurings); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati,
Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002) (further examining the role of
collective action clauses—as well as other contractual solutions and existing civil procedures in the
U.S.—in facilitating sovereign debt restructurings).
49. For a practitioner-oriented discussion of consent thresholds in loan agreements, see Suhrud
Mehta & Lauren Hanrahan, Who’s Calling the Shots?, INT’L. FIN. L. REV., June 2013, at 23.
OF
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for giving the majority the power to force certain terms down the throats
of a dissenting minority.
In this way, minority holdouts are assumed to be at best misguided; at
worst, they are acting to advance their own self-interest at the expense of
the majority. Either way, their continued holdout threatens the best
interests of the entire group, such that forcing them to accept the
majority-approved restructuring is justified. However, a handful of
provisions that relate to the lenders’ most important economic rights
(referred to in industry parlance as “sacred rights”)50 still commonly
require unanimous consent. These sacred rights include, among other
things, key economic terms such as the amount of principal outstanding
and the interest rate applicable to the loan.51
When a syndicate of senior lenders refuses to consent to an out-ofcourt restructuring, either because a majority of lenders declines to see
the value in restructuring or because the consent thresholds in the
applicable agreements are too high to overcome the holdouts, corporate
stakeholders may choose to pursue chapter 11 bankruptcy.52 Bankruptcy
may also be necessary when there is sufficient senior lender support, but
the broader restructuring plan requires other interventions that can only
be obtained through a bankruptcy proceeding.53 The following section
provides a brief overview of these in-court restructurings.
B.

The Conventional Wisdom of Bankruptcy Restructurings

Given the obstacles to achieving out-of-court restructurings, a legal
solution to corporate financial distress is needed to ensure that
companies can be liquidated in an orderly manner or rehabilitated to
preserve going concern value. Over the years, a variety of formal and
informal state and federal insolvency regimes have been developed to

50. For a practitioner-oriented discussion of sacred rights, see Kristina L. Anderson, The Skinny
on
Workouts—Dynamics
in
Bank
Syndicates,
ABF
J.
(Jan.
1,
2011),
https://www.abfjournal.com/articles/the-skinny-on-workouts-dynamics-in-bank-syndicates
[https://perma.cc/2KJD-8QDR].
51. Id.
52. Most bankruptcy filings are made after weeks or months of out-of-court restructuring
discussions. See, e.g., Peg Brickley & Tom Corrigan, Breitburn Energy Partners Files for Chapter
11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2016, 5:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breitburnenergy-partners-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-1463400009 (last visited Nov. 2, 2021) (describing
the company’s monthlong negotiations with creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy protection).
53. For instance, bankruptcy allows debtors to reject leases and other executory contracts. See 11
U.S.C. § 365. For a discussion of the common scenarios that tend to favor bankruptcy, see
Duberstein, supra note 32, at 351–54.
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address this need.54 It would be impossible to review all of them here;
accordingly, this section focuses on modern bankruptcy reorganizations
proceeding under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Through chapter 11, bankruptcy offers a legal framework to help shift
some bargaining power to the debtor, neutralize the holdout risk, and
provide a limited pathway for nonconsensual restructurings. And, while
bankruptcy law provides a range of protections for secured creditors, it
also helps to recenter restructuring discussions around enhancing the
company’s long-term prospects as a going concern, thereby theoretically
maximizing the potential recoveries of all stakeholders rather than those
in positions of control.
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, two important legal events
immediately take place. First, a bankruptcy estate is created, composed
primarily of property in which the debtor had an interest prior to the
bankruptcy filing.55 Second, an automatic stay goes into effect,
protecting the debtor and property of the estate from further collection
efforts or enforcement actions by creditors (and almost everyone else,
for that matter).56 Collectively, these two mechanisms prevent the
quintessential “race to the courthouse” that might occur outside of
bankruptcy, as self-interested creditors rush to collect what they are
owed before others seize any remaining value.57
In most chapter 11 cases, there is no trustee appointed to oversee the
estate; instead, the debtor continues to make decisions in respect of its
property—within certain legal parameters—as a “debtor in
possession.”58 For instance, the debtor may use, sell, or lease property of
the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice to others or a
judicial hearing.59 In order to use, sell, or lease property of the estate
outside of the ordinary course of business, the debtor must provide
notice and attend a hearing where other stakeholders may appear and
voice objections.60 In evaluating requests of this sort, bankruptcy courts
54. The various historical and present-day regimes are richly explored elsewhere. See, e.g.,
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2003)
(providing a thorough historical account of the evolution of U.S. bankruptcy laws, focusing on how
political and economic forces helped shape the legal regime).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
56. Id. § 362.
57. This fundamental goal of bankruptcy law is concisely explained in Mark J. Roe, Three Ages
of Bankruptcy, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 187, 191–92 (2017).
58. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108. Unless the context suggests otherwise, I use the term “debtor” to
refer to the debtor-in-possession.
59. Id. § 363(c)(1).
60. Id. § 363(b)(1).
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typically grant considerable deference to the debtor’s business judgment.
Meanwhile, the debtor is expected to work towards a confirmable
plan of reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the
exclusive right to propose a plan for the first 120 days of the case, with
extensions commonly requested and granted.61 Increasingly, debtors
enter chapter 11 with some or even all of the critical pieces of a plan
already in place—either in the form of a prepackaged or prenegotiated
plan, or in the form of a support agreement in which major stakeholders
commit in advance to support a plan that meets certain general or
specific parameters.62 A bankruptcy plan may contemplate using the
same restructuring techniques that are used out of court; and, much like
out-of-court restructurings, bankruptcy plans may blend together
multiple techniques into sophisticated hybrid plans. Meanwhile, the
debtor is also expected to review its executory contracts and unexpired
leases and determine, generally, whether to assume, reject, or attempt to
renegotiate these agreements for better terms.63
Collectively, these rules afford the bankrupt company some breathing
room to reflect on the business and determine next steps. And, to the
extent they place the debtor in the driver’s seat for the most important
restructuring decisions, they also shift some of the bargaining power
back to the debtor. Of course, modern commercial realities undercut
these dynamics somewhat. For instance, business debtors typically enter
bankruptcy in dire need of cash to finance operations and pay for goods
and services. If—as is very often the case—all of the company’s cash is
subject to security interests, it constitutes “cash collateral” and cannot be
used without the consent of the secured party or express permission of
the court.64
If the debtor cannot obtain permission to use cash collateral, or if the
amount of available cash is insufficient, the debtor may need to obtain
financing on a post-petition basis.65 These so-called “DIP loans”—which
are often extended by the debtor’s most powerful stakeholders—tend to
include highly restrictive covenants that bind the company to certain

61. Id. § 1121.
62. For more on agreements of this sort, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate
Bankruptcy, 130 YALE L.J. 366 (2020); Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of
Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 169 (2018); and Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J.
593 (2017).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
64. Id. § 363(c).
65. Id. § 364.
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restructuring decisions and timelines.66 DIP loans are also typically
extended on a super-priority basis, meaning that they have the right to be
repaid before most other claims.67 In light of these and other aspects of
modern chapter 11 practice, many argue that senior lenders68—
including, in particular, DIP lenders69—have far too much power over
bankruptcy restructurings.
But while chapter 11’s modern-day impacts on bargaining power may
be debated, the Bankruptcy Code’s ability to neutralize the holdout risk
is much clearer. Because bankruptcy restructuring is typically an
exercise in scarcity, most plans contemplate impairment of some claims
and interests. In accordance with bankruptcy’s default distributional rule
of absolute priority,70 value flows downward, with senior classes entitled
to be paid in full before junior classes receive anything.71 To this end,
the plan organizes creditors and interest holders into classes based on the
nature of the claim or interest,72 ranked in terms of priority.73
Parties are given detailed information about the plan and the debtor’s
overall financial condition. Then they are asked to vote on the plan on a
class-by-class basis. A class is considered to accept the plan if it is
accepted by creditors holding a majority in number and at least twothirds in amount of allowed claims in the class.74 In this way, bankruptcy

66. See generally Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market
Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 651 (2020).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (allowing debtors to incur debts with priority over any or all
administrative expenses).
68. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839 (2005)
(exploring the role of creditor control in modern business bankruptcies); George W. Kuney,
Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 19 (2004) (considering how secured creditors, in
particular, exploit certain agency problems that are inherent in chapter 11 bankruptcy); Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673 (2003) (emphasizing
that creditor control is a pervasive feature of chapter 11).
69. I explore the effects of DIP loans on power dynamics in Diane Lourdes Dick, The Bearish
Bankruptcy, 52 GA. L. REV. 437 (2018).
70. Although absolute priority remains the default distributional norm in bankruptcy, Professor
Baird has made a strong case for replacing it with a norm of “relative priority.” See Baird, supra
note 29.
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (providing that a plan may be confirmed over the objections of
impaired parties if it is “fair and equitable,” meaning that holders of claims and interests are either
paid in full or that no junior stakeholders receive a distribution).
72. Id. § 1122.
73. To the extent lenders have entered into intercreditor agreements that restrict the extent to
which they can participate in the debtor’s eventual bankruptcy, courts have struggled with the
question of whether such agreements are enforceable in bankruptcy. For a rich discussion, see
Edward R. Morrison, Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 721.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). A similar rule applies to classes of equity interests. Id. § 1126(d).
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law is able to override the higher consent thresholds—including
requirements of unanimous consent—that would have applied to an outof-court restructuring.
This power to bind holdouts within each class of claims or interests is
a significant feature of bankruptcy law. There are, however, important
safeguards in place for dissenting parties. For instance, the plan must
provide the same treatment for all claims or interests within a class,
unless the holder agrees to be treated differently.75 This means that
creditors are generally entitled to be paid on a pro rata basis with other
similarly-situated creditors.
Following the vote, the plan proponent must obtain judicial
confirmation of the plan by making a showing that it complies with a
long list of requirements laid out in the Bankruptcy Code.76 These
requirements include, among other things, that the plan has been
proposed in good faith77 and that the plan is feasible.78 Many plans are
confirmed on a consensual basis, meaning that each class of claims or
interests that is impaired has accepted the plan.79 But the Bankruptcy
Code also provides a mechanism to cram down a plan over the
objections of one or more dissenting classes.80 As an added check on the
plan proponent’s power, there must be at least one impaired class of
claims that has accepted the plan.81 Plan proponents are not permitted to
engage in class gerrymandering in order to manufacture the required
consenting class.
Assuming at least one impaired class has accepted the plan, the
proponent must show that the plan does not “discriminate unfairly”82 and
that the plan is “fair and equitable”83 with respect to each dissenting
class. Most of the objections to a cramdown plan focus on the latter

75. Id. § 1123(a)(4).
76. Id. § 1129 (which also folds in other requirements, such as those in 11 U.S.C. § 1122 and
§ 1123).
77. Id. § 1129(a)(3). The good faith standard is “generally interpreted to mean that there exists ‘a
reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code.’” In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation
omitted).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
79. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
80. Id. § 1129(b).
81. Id. § 1129(a)(10).
82. Id. § 1129(b)(1). Unfair discrimination is a murky concept that generally means that the
debtor has treated a class differently than another class without any reasonable basis. See, e.g., id.
§ 1322 (laying out a similar standard for a chapter 13 plan).
83. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
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requirement, which is considered by many to be the most essential
creditor safeguard in the Bankruptcy Code.84 Generally speaking, a plan
is fair and equitable with respect to a dissenting class if it provides at
least as much as the class would have been entitled to receive in a
hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation, and no junior holder receives
anything on account of their claim or interest.85 With respect to secured
creditors, who hold property interests that even federal bankruptcy law
cannot undermine, the standard is generally construed to mean that they
retain their lien and receive deferred cash payments with a present value
equal to or greater than the value of their collateral.86
Proving that the fair and equitable standard has been met can be
difficult; it requires expert testimony establishing the likely liquidation
value of the firm as well as the present value of the firm as a going
concern.87 Because bankruptcy law is concerned with the incomegenerating potential of the reorganized firm, going concern value is
primarily measured using the discounted cash flow method.88 Like all
exercises in corporate valuations, these reports are expensive and timeconsuming, and they rely on qualitative inputs from the company.89 For
this reason, the threat of cramdown is often enough to bring parties back
to the negotiation table to reach a consensual plan.
By restoring some bargaining power to the debtor, neutralizing the
holdout risk, and providing a pathway for a nonconsensual restructuring,
bankruptcy is traditionally viewed as a legal process that helps parties
achieve restructurings that they would not have been able to achieve on
an out-of-court basis. And, in so doing, it recenters all parties’ focus on
the company’s long-term prospects as a going concern. This arguably
helps to maximize the recoveries of all stakeholders.
Of course, as this summary of chapter 11 has revealed, there are
84. In a dissenting Third Circuit opinion, Judge Ambro highlighted the importance of the “fair
and equitable” standard: “Instead of the court-determined standard of the prior Bankruptcy Act, the
Bankruptcy Code created stronger creditor safeguards and protections in § 1129(b)(2)(A).” In re
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting); see also
Anthony L. Miscioscia, Jr., The Bankruptcy Code and the New Value Doctrine: An Examination
into History, Illusions, and the Need for Competitive Bidding, 79 VA. L. REV. 917, 919 (1993) (“If
applied rigorously [the cramdown rules] provide[] creditors with a strong leverage device for use in
negotiating reorganization plans.”).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
86. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
87. These valuation reports are the subject of IAN RATNER, GRANT T. STEIN & JOHN C.
WEITNAUER, BUSINESS VALUATION AND BANKRUPTCY (2009).
88. Id. at 39–58.
89. I explore these and related issues in Diane Lourdes Dick, Valuation in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1487.
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numerous statutory requirements that must be satisfied, and bankruptcy
involves many trips to the courthouse. Other parties—including the
smallest stakeholders—may intervene, introducing high levels of
uncertainty. Even where there appears to be consensus among the
parties, the judge90 or the U.S. Trustee91 may object to the debtor’s
proposals. Accordingly, it should be no surprise that bankruptcy comes
with significant costs.92 These costs can be further divided into direct
and indirect costs, with the former category including professional fees
and other expenses and the latter category including various opportunity
costs, such as reputational damage.93
For these reasons, bankruptcy is often viewed as the nuclear option, to
be avoided at all costs.94 Under the conventional wisdom, these realities
ought to encourage parties to work harder to collaborate and reach
consensual out-of-court restructurings. As the following section reveals,
this is not the case anymore. Instead, debtor companies increasingly
pursue hostile restructurings, allowing them to achieve many of the
benefits of a bankruptcy restructuring without all of the risks, costs, or
creditor safeguards.
II.

THE RISE OF HOSTILE OUT-OF-COURT RESTRUCTURINGS

This Part examines a series of illustrative examples of hostile
restructurings. The analysis is divided into two sections, each focusing
on a commonly utilized transaction structure. The first section explores
“uptiering”95 transactions involving the extension of new, senior
tranches of debt. Drawing from restructuring transactions recently
pursued by Serta, Inc., and NYDJ Apparel, LLC, this section shows how

90. Bankruptcy judges possess broad equitable and discretionary powers; they are also expected
to manage cases in ways that produce quick and efficient outcomes. These complex and, at times,
conflicting responsibilities are richly explored in Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in
Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 572; Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled:
Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 427–33 (2006).
91. The role of the U.S. Trustee is thoughtfully explored in Lindsey D. Simon, The Guardian
Trustee in Bankruptcy Courts and Beyond, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1297 (2020).
92. For a comprehensive discussion of bankruptcy costs, see EDWARD I. ALTMAN & EDITH
HOTCHKISS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS AND BANKRUPTCY: PREDICT AND AVOID
BANKRUPTCY, ANALYZE AND INVEST IN DISTRESSED DEBT 71–81 (4th ed. 2019).
93. Id. at 93.
94. See, e.g., Richard Danielson, The Nuclear Option: Clearwater Condo Owners Push Back
Against Bond Debt, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/business/thenuclear-option-clearwater-condo-owners-push-back-against-bond-debt-20190628/
[https://perma.cc/SMV4-ZBZW] (referring to a bankruptcy filing as a “nuclear option”).
95. The term is used in LSTA Presentation, supra note 12.
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these new priming debt issuances are often the product of secretive and
divisive negotiations orchestrated by the company. The second section
explores the “dropdown”96 maneuver to transfer the most valuable
collateral out of the reach of lenders so that it may be used to secure new
debt issuances. Drawing from such prominent examples as J. Crew
Group, Inc. and Revlon, Inc., this section reveals just how contentious
hostile restructurings can be.
A.

Uptiering Restructuring Transactions

In hostile restructurings that use the uptiering transaction structure,
the company issues new super-priority debt. These new extensions of
credit typically roll up the loans of some of the existing lenders,
essentially resulting in an intra-class subordination of some of the senior
debt. For instance, the privately-owned U.S. bedding manufacturer
Serta, Inc. (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the
company’s senior loan agreements, “Serta”)97 recently engaged in a
transaction of this sort, leading to the subordination of the debts of some
of its senior secured lenders.
The story began in 2016, when Serta and its senior lenders entered
into a syndicated first lien loan agreement.98 This senior secured
financing arrangement provided the company with $1.95 billion in loans
(the “First Lien Loans”).99 At the same time, the company and another
group of lenders established a second lien loan facility providing for
$450 million in loans.100 As is typically the case in secured financing
deals structured with first and second lien facilities, each group of
lenders was separately granted liens on the same collateral—here,
Serta’s intellectual property and related royalty streams.101 Then,
pursuant to an intercreditor agreement, the two groups of lenders agreed
that in the event Serta defaults on its obligations and the lenders must
exercise their remedies under the agreements (for instance, by
96. The term is also used in LSTA Presentation, supra note 12.
97. About Serta, SERTA, https://www.serta.com/about [https://perma.cc/H2VB-MZCT].
98. Complaint at 11, North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC,
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Such a lien is enforceable if it is created and attached under U.C.C. § 9-203 (AM. L. INST. &
UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010). Assuming the secured party is the first to perfect a security interest in the
collateral, it will be entitled, after the borrower’s default, to collect against the value of the collateral
before competing lienholders’ claims are satisfied. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2010).
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foreclosing on collateral), the obligations arising under the First Lien
Loans must be satisfied in full before lenders holding second lien loans
are entitled to recover.
To ensure that the proceeds of any such disposition of collateral are
distributed fairly to lenders within each tranche, the loan agreement also
contained a fairly standard payment waterfall provision102 entitling each
lender (after certain expenses and entitled reimbursements are paid) to a
pro rata share of any proceeds of the collateral, based on the face amount
of loans that each lender owns.103 This means that, within each tranche,
no lender would have a superior right to the value of the collateral over
any other lender. As further evidence of the lenders’ commitment to
proportional sharing of proceeds, the loan agreement provided that to the
extent any lender receives payment on account of its loans that is of a
greater proportion than that received by others, the surplus must be
shared ratably among the lenders within that tranche.104
Serta’s loan agreement generally provided that it may be amended
with the consent of the “Required Lenders,” a term defined to mean
lenders holding more than 50% of the face value of the loans.105
Meanwhile, sacred rights could only be amended with “the consent of
each Lender directly and adversely affected thereby.”106 This unanimous
consent requirement applied to, among other things, the amendment of
critical economic terms, such as the outstanding principal amount, the
interest rate, and the maturity date.107 It also applied to amendments to
the waterfall provision requiring pro rata sharing of any proceeds of
collateral.108 But not every transaction in which a lender receives value
102. The Third Circuit recently explained how provisions of this sort function. See In re Energy
Future Holdings Corp., 773 F. App’x 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2019) (“A waterfall provision sets the order in
which parties will receive benefits from an asset pool.”).
103. For the relevant excerpts from the loan agreement, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Their Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and
Expedited Discovery, Exhibit B, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B]. Section 2.18(b) contains the payment waterfall.
That section provides that after certain expenses are paid, the proceeds of collateral are to be divided
pro rata among the first lien lenders, based on the face amount of their ownership of loans. This
means that all first lien lenders would share the proceeds based on the percentage of the loans that
they own. See Complaint, supra note 98, at 15.
104. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 76–77 (reprinting
section 2.18(c)).
105. Lender Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery at 7, Serta,
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum].
106. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 137 (reprinting section 9.02(b)(A)).
107. Id. at 137–38 (reprinting sections 9.02(b)(A)(1)–(6)).
108. Id. at 138 (reprinting section 9.02(b)(A)(6)).
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on account of its debt position would be subject to the pro rata sharing
requirement. In carveout language, the agreement provided that consent
was not required for debt-to-debt exchanges on a non-pro rata basis that
take place pursuant to an open market transaction,109 even if Serta is the
one purchasing the debt.110
In the years following Serta’s entry into the loan agreement, the
company’s financial condition worsened. The company faced increased
competition from new direct-to-consumer mattress brands.111 It also
faced mounting pressure as one of its largest retail partners filed for
bankruptcy protection.112 By early 2020, with the global COVID-19
pandemic threatening another recession, Serta found it increasingly
difficult to manage the risks and consequences of a highly leveraged
balance sheet. Although management continued to offer assurances that
the company was on solid footing, rating agencies slashed Serta’s ratings
to junk.113 By June, the First Lien Loans were trading at less than fifty
cents on the dollar, while the second lien loans were trading at less than
twenty cents on the dollar.114
To enhance the firm’s balance sheet and improve liquidity, Serta
commenced negotiations with various groups of existing lenders to
restructure the senior secured debt. This was no small undertaking; at the
time, there was over $2 billion in debt still outstanding under the senior
secured facility. The company’s board of directors formed a special
finance committee of independent directors to consider and evaluate
proposals.115 Serta entered into confidentiality agreements with several
lender groups, binding them to “no-talk”116 provisions that would
prevent them from disclosing the terms of a potential deal to other
lenders and potentially coordinating with each other to the detriment of
109. Id. at 149 (reprinting section 9.05(g)). The term “affiliated lender” is defined elsewhere in
the agreement to include Serta. See Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 12.
110. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 77 (reprinting
section 2.18(c)(ii)(B), which carves out the proceeds of an assignment or sale of loans pursuant to
section 9.05 from the pro rata sharing provision).
111. Affidavit of Allen Barry Canipe at 2, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222
[hereinafter Canipe Affidavit].
112. See Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Mattress Firm, Inc.,
No. 18-12241-CSS (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2020).
113. Complaint, supra note 98, at 16.
114. Affirmation of Jennifer L. Conn in Support of Lender Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery,
Exhibit 2, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222.
115. These efforts are described more fully in the Canipe Affidavit, supra note 111.
116. Such provisions, and the closely related “no-shop” provisions, are the subject of Karl F.
Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (2003).
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Serta.117
Serta would later characterize these negotiations as a “competitive
process between competing lender groups” conducted in good faith.118
Through this process, two lead proposals emerged: the first, advanced by
lenders holding a slim majority of the First Lien Loans, contemplated a
new super-priority debt facility consisting of the participating lenders’
loans, which would prime all of the existing tranches under the senior
secured facility.119 The other, proposed by a group of lenders holding
approximately 30% of the First Lien Loans, contemplated the transfer of
the most valuable collateral away from the lenders under the senior
secured facility so that it could be used to secure the participating
lenders’ loans.120 Each proposal provided much-needed access to new
credit; each was also an exclusive deal, meaning that lender participation
would be limited to those lenders involved in the negotiations.
Serta—acting through its special finance committee—chose the
former proposal over the latter, and in June 2020 the company
announced that it had reached a deal that would reduce the company’s
overall debt burden by approximately $400 million.121 The restructuring
would unfold as follows. First, lenders holding 50.1% of the First Lien
Loans122 would fund $200 million in new First Lien Loan debt.123 Then,
the company would conduct a debt-to-debt exchange on a non-pro rata
basis with these participating lenders, pursuant to which the lenders
would swap, at a discount,124 their First Lien Loans (including the
117. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery
at 5, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 [hereinafter Serta’s Memorandum].
118. Id. at 1.
119. This structure had been used by other companies in recent years. See, e.g., CPI Card Group
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 15 (Apr. 23, 2020) (describing an uptiering transaction
effectuated in March 2020); Fusion Connect, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 10, 2019)
(describing an uptiering transaction effectuated in May 2019); McDermott International, Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 17, 2019) (describing an uptiering transaction effectuated in
October 2019).
120. This structure is described in more detail infra section II.B.
121. Press Release, Serta, Inc., Serta Simmons Bedding Enters into Agreement with Majority of
Lenders on Deleveraging and Liquidity Enhancing Transaction (June 8, 2020),
https://sertasimmons.com/news/serta-simmons-bedding-enters-into-agreement-with-majority-oflenders-on-deleveraging-and-liquidity-enhancing-transaction/
[https://perma.cc/C6TM-C5AM]
[hereinafter Serta Press Release].
122. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 6.
123. See Serta Press Release, supra note 121. Loan agreements typically allow the company to
issue to debt under certain circumstances.
124. The company would provide seventy-four cents of new loans in exchange for each dollar of
existing first lien loans. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 12.
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$200 million in new loans) for loans issued under a new credit facility.125
Next, the participating lenders would use their majority power to execute
a series of amendments to the 2016 loan agreement that would give the
new loan facility senior payment priority. Finally, the parties would
execute an intercreditor agreement establishing the payment priorities
for the new facility.126
Once these steps were completed, the proposed credit facility would
include the $200 million in new loans, which would prime all of the
other debt (called a super-priority “first out” in industry parlance).127
Next, there would be a $875 million debt facility (known as a “second
out” tranche) consisting of the debt exchanged by the participating
lenders.128 Last, the agreement contemplated an unspecified amount of
“third out” debt that would potentially arise in the future.129 And,
pursuant to the amendments to the 2016 loan agreement, all tranches of
the new facility would rank ahead of the First Lien Loans. In other
words, following the consummation of these transactions, there would
be more than $1 billion in debt that would have priority over the
$814 million remaining First Lien Loans owned by the lenders who were
not invited to participate in the restructuring.
Unwilling to accept this fate, the lenders who advanced the losing
proposal filed suit in a New York state court against Serta, its private
equity owner, and the lenders participating in the restructuring.130 The
plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the restructuring amounted to
a breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.131 Given that time was of the essence, the aggrieved
lenders asked the court to impose a preliminary injunction132 and
125. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Exhibit B, supra note 103, at 149 (reprinting section 9.05(g)). The
language does not expressly prohibit exclusive deals.
126. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 18.
127. See Serta Press Release, supra note 121.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally Complaint, supra note 98 (initiating the lawsuit).
131. There is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (providing a concise restatement of
the prevailing U.S. common law concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing); U.C.C. § 1-304
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2010) (setting forth the duty of good faith applicable to contracts
and duties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code).
132. A preliminary injunction is granted where a plaintiff can demonstrate (1) a likelihood of
ultimate success on the merits; (2) the prospect of irreparable injury if the provisional relief is
withheld; and (3) a balance of equities tipping in the moving party’s favor. See Gramercy Co. v.
Benenson, 223 A.D.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6301, 6313 (CONSOL.
2021).
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temporary restraining order133 to enjoin the already-announced
transactions until a decision could be reached on the merits.
In their breach of contract claim, the plaintiffs had to overcome
Serta’s insistence that each individual step of the proposed restructuring
was permitted under the loan agreement. For instance, the proposed debt
exchange arguably constituted a permissible open market transaction,
such that it may take place on a non-pro rata basis.134 Similarly, the
priming amendment arguably only required majority lender consent.135
Further bolstering Serta’s case, the loan agreement did not include a
common provision prohibiting subordination of claims or liens without
unanimous consent.136
The plaintiffs, for their part, argued that the overall economic effect
of the restructuring violated the plain language of the loan agreement
because such profound changes to the rights of senior secured lenders
must require unanimous consent.137 For instance, the plaintiffs argued
that the defendants effectively amended the pro rata sharing clause
without the consent of all of the lenders.138 In a similar way, the
plaintiffs insisted that the proposed transaction would have the economic
effect of releasing substantially all of their collateral, and that any such
release also requires unanimous consent.139 In essence, they argued that
the proposed transaction would effectively relegate the plaintiffs to
unsecured status in clear violation of their sacred rights in the loan
agreement.140
The plaintiffs also complained that the company went about the
restructuring process in a way that violated the lenders’ procedural
133. A temporary restraining order is a remedy that requires the proponent demonstrate (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a restraining order, and (3) a
balance of equities tipping in its favor. See Silvestre v. De Loaiza, 820 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2006). In Serta, the plaintiffs argued that such relief was necessary because, absent
intervention by the court, the plaintiffs would suffer “immediate and irreparable injury” from the
transaction moving forward. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Application
for a Temporary Restraining Order, a Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery at 14–20,
North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum].
134. This interpretation is based on the provisions in the loan agreement, discussed supra notes
109 and 110 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing how amendments to the loan
agreement generally only require the consent of a majority of the lenders).
136. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 8.
137. Complaint, supra note 98, at 3–5.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 4.
140. On sacred rights, see Anderson, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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rights. Namely, they argued that the exclusive nature of the proposed
restructuring essentially amounted to an “unlawful scheme to rob certain
of Serta’s lenders, including Plaintiffs, of their bargained-for
rights. . .while protecting and providing special benefits to a group of
favored lenders who agreed to participate in the scheme.”141 Serta, for its
part, acknowledged the exclusive nature of the deal. But the company
argued that this was a feature rather than a bug:
Plaintiffs suggest that they should be permitted to participate in
the Proposed Transaction, but Plaintiffs’ participation would not
accomplish the goal of deleveraging the Company. If every First
Lien Loan lender was permitted to exchange their debt into the
new facility, there would be no reduction in debt because the
participating lenders would not be incentivized to sell their debt
at a discount, whereas now, with the Defendant Lenders, the net
reduction is nearly $400 million.142
Then, the company reminded the court that one of the plaintiffs had
spearheaded a losing restructuring proposal, which would have had
similar effects on excluded lenders. Serta remarked that this lender must
know full well that “this is the way restructuring transactions are
commonly done.”143
The company also challenged the plaintiffs’ argument that the
proposed transaction amounted to lien stripping, reminding the court that
all existing liens would remain in place.144 And, in response to the
plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief, Serta insisted that there can be no
irreparable harm because the purported damages have a determinable
value and each plaintiff can be made whole through an award of money
damages.145 Thus, even if the court were to accept the plaintiffs’
argument that their liens had been effectively stripped, “the liens only
protect Plaintiffs’ right to be paid money, just as the allegedly
depreciating value of the loans is measured in dollars and cents. All that
would be required to make Plaintiffs whole is a simple calculation of the
value of their debt.”146 Finally, Serta shrugged off concerns about the
141. Complaint, supra note 98, at 3.
142. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 9; see also Affidavit of Roopesh K. Shah at 9,
North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Shah Affidavit] (“[T]he fewer holders
that are offered the opportunity to participate in the debt-for-debt exchange, the more incentivized
they will be to exchange the debt at a greater discount.”).
143. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 10.
144. Id. at 12 (“First, no one is stripping Plaintiffs of their liens in the collateral.”)
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
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company’s solvency and the minority lenders’ eventual position in any
future bankruptcy reorganization. These hypothetical concerns were, in
its view, insufficient grounds for a finding of irreparable harm:
“Plaintiffs are left claiming a vague harm to their bargaining
‘leverage.’”147
Moreover, the company’s advisors maintained that Serta would suffer
significant and irreparable harm if the proposed transactions were
enjoined. A financial advisor explained that if the transaction did not go
forward:
[Serta’s] lenders will have no incentive to negotiate with [Serta]
as separate groups, and instead would be incentivized to unite so
as to obtain the best terms for the lenders, to the detriment of
[Serta]. As [Serta’s] lenders now know their respective positions
on a potential refinancing, the lenders have no incentive to
compete with one another to grant [Serta] favorable terms, but
rather are incentivized to act as one group.148
In the financial advisor’s view, the company’s carefully constructed
“competitive process” offered the only “meaningful opportunity for the
company to deleverage.”149
Given the tendency for courts to strictly construe commercial finance
agreements,150 the weight of the authority was against the plaintiffs. But
the plaintiffs also alleged that the restructuring breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.151 Under basic principles of state
contract law, every agreement contains an implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing.152 This is generally understood to mean that parties to
contracts should behave honestly and work to uphold the spirit of the
agreement.
To bolster the latter claim, the plaintiffs reminded the court of a 2018
decision to deny a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging similar
conduct.153 The debtor in that case, clothing manufacturer NYDJ
Apparel, LLC (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the
company’s senior loan agreements, “NYDJ”), had engaged in an
uptiering transaction in May 2017 with 53% of lenders from the
147. Id. at 13.
148. Shah Affidavit, supra note 142, at 8.
149. Id.
150. See generally Dick, supra note 14 (discussing courts’ modern reliance on strict interpretation
of commercial financing agreements).
151. Complaint, supra note 98, at 23.
152. See sources cited supra note 131.
153. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, supra note 133, at 17.
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company’s senior secured credit facility.154
The NYDJ plaintiffs—composed of dissenting minority lenders—
argued that the restructuring negotiations were conducted “with no
notice, under cover of darkness,”155 and that some lenders only learned
of the proposed transaction when it was publicly announced. One
plaintiff lender alleged that it had been invited to participate in the
scheme months earlier but declined to do so because it believed that the
plan was proposed in bad faith.156 According to this plaintiff, the plan
proponent had boasted “that the number of lenders benefitting from [the
scheme] would be kept to the bare minimum necessary to form a
majority so that the spoils of the scheme could be shared among the
smallest possible pool of lenders.”157
At a hearing to address the conflicts surrounding NYDJ’s
restructuring, the judge seemed to take issue with the secretive nature of
the negotiations. After parsing through language in the agreement
establishing consent thresholds for various types of amendments, the
judge took a moment to reflect on the broader meaning of the words in
the original agreement. “Doesn’t the phrase written consent imply that
you’re going to ask everyone to consent?”158 More broadly, he asked,
“Isn’t there an implied covenant of good faith anymore?”159 When the
company’s attorneys attempted to redirect the court’s attention to
language requiring a simple majority, the judge expounded further on
customary practice and reasonable commercial expectations of good
faith and fair dealing in this context:
No, no. I’m not saying they required the written consent of
every lender. But how do you determine if you have the consent
of lender A, if you don’t ask lender A would you consent.
Instead, you have a quote majority, a slight majority, going off
into a side room and saying we’re going to consent amongst
ourselves and to hell with the rest of these guys. It really seems
unethical.160
154. NYDJ, or Can You Really Prime 47% of Lenders Without Their Consent?, KING &
SPALDING, https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/008/524/original/How_did_they_do_it_NYDJ.
pdf?1611586634 [https://perma.cc/726C-4NPG].
155. Complaint at 5, Octagon Credit Invs., LLC v. NYDJ Apparel, LLC, No. 656677/2017 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 1, 2017).
156. Id. at 12–13.
157. Id. at 12.
158. Transcript of Proceedings at 22, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.
27, 2018).
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id. at 23.
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The aggrieved lenders had advanced a similar interpretation,
explaining that “the reason you have the class vote is so the majority of
the class can bind the holdouts that don’t go along with class vote. The
purpose of the provision isn’t to allow the majority to [improve its own
position at the expense of] the minority.”161 From that vantage point, it
was not hard to see that the company’s restructuring proposal violated
both the language and the spirit of the original loan agreement, as well as
the most basic conceptions of good faith and fair dealing. For these
reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss, opining that the
plaintiffs had stated a claim for, among other things, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.162 The parties later
reached a settlement pursuant to which NYDJ invited all of the lenders
to exchange their debt at a discounted rate and participate in a new
facility.163
Although the dispute surrounding the NYDJ restructuring was similar
in some respects to the dispute surrounding Serta’s restructuring, there
were important differences. For one, the plaintiffs opposing Serta’s
restructuring were far less sympathetic, particularly in their quest for
equitable relief—in fact, they arguably came to the court with unclean
hands.164 This is because they had tried to advance their own exclusive
restructuring plan that, in the words of the defendants, “would have done
the very thing [the plaintiffs] now accuse[] the Defendant Lenders of
doing—stripping hundreds of millions of dollars of existing collateral
away from the other lenders, and placing them . . . in an exclusive
‘super-priority’ position in the event of default.”165
Additionally, although NYDJ, like Serta, had insisted that the
transactions were permitted under the plain language of the loan
agreement, there was at least some circumstantial evidence in the NYDJ
restructuring to suggest otherwise. Notably, the company’s law firm, in a
third-party legal opinion addressing the restructuring agreement’s
enforceability, expressly declined to opine as to whether the company
had complied with the consent provisions in the loan agreement.166

161. Id. at 37.
162. Id. at 43.
163. See Affirmation, Exhibit B at 13, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017.
164. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 1; see also United for Peace & Just. v.
Bloomberg, 783 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying a request for an injunction where
“plaintiff does not come to court with ‘clean hands’”).
165. Serta’s Memorandum, supra note 117, at 2.
166. Exhibit G at 7, Octagon Credit Invs., No. 656677/2017 (providing a copy of the legal
opinion; the relevant qualification is set forth in paragraph (u)).
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Finally, although the record in the NYDJ dispute was thin with
respect to the company’s process for vetting proposals, Serta provided
ample evidence of management’s efforts to comply with their fiduciary
obligations in evaluating a major transaction. For instance, the company
had spent nearly a year evaluating multiple strategic alternatives, and
even retained a law firm and financial advisor to assist with the
process.167 And, as Serta narrowed down its options to several
competing proposals, it vested decision-making authority in a committee
of independent directors.168 These internal processes helped to frame the
restructuring as a sound exercise of business judgment, and possibly the
company’s only option to survive a severe economic downturn.
After initially entering a temporary restraining order to prevent Serta
from moving forward with the proposed restructuring,169 the court
declined to grant the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.170
This is because, in the court’s view, the plaintiffs had failed to establish
a likelihood of success on the merits.171 Adopting the company’s
hypertechnical interpretation, the court explained that it “seems to
permit[] the debt-to-debt exchange on a non-pro rata basis as part of an
open market transaction.”172 And, since the amendments did not, in the
court’s view, impact sacred rights under the loan agreement, unanimous
consent was not required.173 Serta completed the restructuring in June
2020.174
B.

Drop-Down Restructuring Transactions
In hostile restructurings that use the drop-down transaction

167. See generally Affidavit, supra note 142.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Defendants’ Memorandum, supra note 105, at 13.
170. Order at 11, North Star Debt Holdings, L.P. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC,
No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 4, 2020).
171. Id. at 9–10.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id.
174. Press Release, Serta, Inc., Serta Simmons Bedding Closes Previously Announced
Deleveraging
and
Liquidity
Enhancing
Transaction
(June
22,
2020),
https://sertasimmons.com/news/serta-simmons-bedding-closes-previously-announced-deleveragingand-liquidity-enhancing-transaction/ [https://perma.cc/NAX6-YUGJ]. The plaintiffs continued to
pursue the matter in federal court, but their claims were dismissed in March 2021. Transcript of
Hearing at 7, Serta, No. 652243/2020, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4222; see also Opinion, LCM XXII
Ltd. v. Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC, No. 20-cv-5090, at 1–2 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 9, 2021); Complaint,
LCM XXII Ltd., No. 20-cv-5090.
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structure,175 companies transfer valuable collateral out of the reach of
existing lenders in order to secure new debt issuances. This structure was
infamously used by U.S. apparel retailer J. Crew Group, Inc.
(collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the company’s senior
loan agreements, “J. Crew”), when, in 2016, certain senior secured
lenders under a $1.57 billion credit facility claimed to have been
“shocked and dismayed” to find themselves on the losing end of a dropdown restructuring.176
Specifically, the company had transferred certain portions of the
lenders’ most valuable intellectual property collateral—including the “J.
Crew” branding—to new, wholly-owned subsidiaries that would not be
considered debtors or guarantors under the loan agreement.177 At the
time of the transfer, the intellectual property assets were estimated by J.
Crew to be worth approximately $250 million,178 while the aggrieved
lenders would later assert that these assets were worth upwards of $1
billion.179 Following the transfer, the company promised to redirect $59
million per year to the new subsidiary to compensate it for the use of the
intellectual property for branding and merchandising purposes.180
When they learned of the transfer, the senior secured lenders
collectively demanded the resignation of the administrative agent181 and
appointed a new one.182 The company, sensing opposition on the
horizon, sued the newly-appointed administrative agent for a declaratory
judgment ratifying the transfers and declaring them permissible under
the agreement.183 The agent asserted counterclaims, arguing that the
asset transfer violated the loan agreement and also constituted a
fraudulent transfer.184
175. “Drop-down transaction” is an industry term for a restructuring in which the company
transfers assets to a subsidiary, typically in order to effectuate a sale transaction or to secure debt
issued by that subsidiary. See generally Scott W. Dolson, Rollover Equity Transactions 2021,
FROST BROWN TODD LLC (Jan. 28, 2021), https://frostbrowntodd.com/rollover-equity-transactions/
[https://perma.cc/4D5G-3JAN].
176. Complaint at 3, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017,
2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 19.
179. Affidavit at 13, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405.
180. Complaint, supra note 176, at 4.
181. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 19, J. Crew Grp., Inc. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund
Soc’y, No. 650574/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 2017).
182. Complaint, supra note 176, at 37.
183. Complaint, supra note 181, at 19.
184. Defendant’s Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims at 21–22, J. Crew Grp., Inc.
v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 650574/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 24, 2017).
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Specifically, the agent argued that the transfer was part of a
“multistep process to divert the value of [a] ‘critical’ and ‘integral’ asset
away from J. Crew Company and its creditors” for the benefit of equity
owners,185 and that each individual step—much like the transaction as a
whole—was in violation of the loan agreement. For instance, one of the
earliest steps in the transaction was the designation of “unrestricted
subsidiaries.”186 While the agreement contained common language
allowing the company to make designations of this sort, the company
could only do so upon a showing that the company was then in
compliance with certain financial covenants.187 But according to the
agent, the company’s calculations, as well as certain inputs used to make
those calculations, were incorrect.188 As a result, the company’s
designation of the subsidiaries as unrestricted constituted a default under
the loan agreement.189 The agent also claimed that J. Crew was actually
insolvent at the time of the transfers, and that the transfers were
primarily motivated by a desire to drive down the value of the senior
secured debt so that the company could buy back the loans at a
discount.190
J. Crew, for its part, argued that the transactions were permitted under
the plain language of the loan agreement.191 This is because the
agreement contained several common carveouts that allowed
investments by the company in both restricted and unrestricted
subsidiaries.192 For instance, the agreement allowed investments in
unrestricted subsidiaries up to certain predetermined thresholds, plus an
additional amount based on earnings if the company was not in
default.193
In June 2017, while the agent’s suit was still pending, the company
announced the next steps in the drop-down transaction: J. Crew would
185. Id. at 19.
186. Id. at 20. In typical loan agreements, so-called restricted subsidiaries are subject to
covenants while unrestricted subsidiaries are not.
187. Id. at 30–31.
188. Id. at 31–32.
189. Id. at 32.
190. See id. at 51–52.
191. J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Order to Show Cause for Entry
of a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary Injunction at 21–22, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v.
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018)
[hereinafter J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law].
192. Complaint, supra note 181, at 17–18. The company describes how each step of the
transaction technically complies with the loan agreement in its Complaint. Id. at 12–14.
193. Id. at 13.
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use the new, asset-rich, unrestricted subsidiaries to entice certain junior,
unsecured bondholders to exchange their debt for new secured bonds of
lesser principal amount and longer maturities.194 Meanwhile, the
company solicited senior secured lenders to consent to the transactions,
direct the agent to drop the lawsuit, and agree to certain amendments to
the loan agreement.195 To sweeten the proverbial pot, the company
offered to purchase up to $150 million of the senior secured debt at par
even though the loans were then trading at seventy cents on the dollar.196
The lenders were given three days to decide.197
Lenders who collectively held approximately 88% of the outstanding
loans voted to accept the restructuring terms.198 Accordingly, the agent
received a written direction instructing the agent to acknowledge the
amendments to the loan agreement and dismiss the pending litigation
once the amendments became effective.199 In a last-ditch effort to stop
the transaction, minority lenders filed suit in New York state court
against the company and the agent to enjoin the transactions.200 The
minority lenders raised, among other things, breach of contract and
fraudulent conveyance claims.201
The court denied the minority lenders’ request for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.202 In so ruling, the court
seemed to be most persuaded by the fact that such a large majority of
lenders consented to the transaction.203 The company and the agent later
moved to dismiss most of the lenders’ claims on the grounds that the
Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief were
moot.204 Although the minority lenders argued that they should be
permitted to bring claims when compliance with a no-action clause in

194. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend/Supplement Counterclaims
at 2, J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 650574/2017.
195. See Complaint, supra note 176, at 5.
196. Id. at 25.
197. Id.
198. J. Crew’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 191, at 1.
199. Stipulation and [Proposed] Order at 2, J. Crew Grp., Inc., No. 650574/2017.
200. Complaint, supra note 176, at 50–53.
201. Id.
202. Transcript at 46–49, Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, No. 654397/2017,
2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018).
203. See id.
204. See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Eaton Vance
Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405 (providing further support for the movant’s
arguments).
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the agreement would be futile,205 the court declined to embrace this
argument and granted the motions to dismiss in April 2018.206 The
minority lenders appealed, but the appellate court upheld the trial court’s
decision.207 With only one narrow breach of contract claim remaining
(based on an argument that the transaction required unanimous consent),
the parties engaged in discovery for over a year before the minority
lenders finally dropped the suit.208
Following the company’s legal victories, the drop-down structure has
come to be known as the “J. Crew” transaction; the term is also used as a
verb—to be “J. Crewed.”209 But while J. Crew has the dubious
distinction of setting the deal precedent,210 more recent transactions have
only upped the ante. Consider the recent restructuring of a $2 billion
senior secured credit facility by U.S.-based global beauty company
Revlon, Inc. (collectively, with its subsidiaries that are party to the
company’s senior loan agreements, “Revlon”).211 The credit facility,
established in 2016 to finance the acquisition of the Elizabeth Arden
brand portfolio, was secured by, among other things, Revlon’s most
valuable intellectual property, including trademarks and other rights
associated with some of the world’s most well-known beauty brands.
In August 2019, Revlon commenced a drop-down transaction to
transfer intellectual property assets to a new subsidiary, beyond the
reach of the senior secured lenders’ security interests. As in J. Crew,
these assets were then leased back to the operating subsidiaries so that
they could continue to use the intellectual property in their business
activities. Finally, the company used the newly transferred assets to
secure $200 million in new debt.212
205. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 14, Eaton Vance
Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405.
206. See, e.g., Decision and Order, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405
(granting the motions to dismiss).
207. Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 99 N.Y.S.3d 28, 28 (App. Div. 2019).
208. Stipulation of Discontinuance, Eaton Vance Mgmt., No. 654397/2017, 2018 WL 1947405.
209. Peter Coy, In Finance, ‘J. Crew’ Is a Verb. It Means to Stick It to a Lender, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 17, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0617/in-finance-j-crew-is-a-verb-it-means-to-stick-it-to-a-lender [https://perma.cc/AA6R-R3JS].
210. Soon after the transaction was completed, one rather prescient observer predicted that
“[r]ivals who once mimicked the fashionable items on its racks will soon be copying its debt
restructuring.” Lauren Silva Laughlin, J. Crew Debt Maneuver Can Be a Model for Other Troubled
Retailers, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/
dealbook/jcrew-retailers-debt.html [https://perma.cc/4CHS-ZKEK].
211. Our Company, REVLON, https://www.revloninc.com/our-company [https://perma.cc/J9DKKB2H].
212. Jasmine Wu, Revlon Stock Jumps on Report that the Cosmetics Company Is Considering a
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In the spring of 2020, Revlon proposed repeating the maneuver in a
transaction that some senior lenders would later argue “siphoned off
nearly all of the remaining intellectual property” securing the obligations
owed to them.213 This time around, Revlon proposed issuing nearly $900
million in new debt, secured by a first-priority lien on the intellectual
property.214 $200 million of the new debt would be used to pay off the
debt issued in the smaller J. Crew maneuver that the company had
previously completed.215 Additionally, the new facility would roll up
approximately $950 million of debt under the 2016 facility, granting
these participating lenders second and third priority liens.216 Excluded
lenders would have no liens at all in the intellectual property. And, while
they would continue to have liens on the company’s remaining assets,
their interest would be diluted by a pari passu lien securing the new
tranches.217
Under the loan agreement, the transfer of the intellectual property
collateral, the release of the senior lenders’ liens on such property, and
the grant of the pari passu lien on the balance of the senior lenders’
collateral would all require consent by a majority of the senior secured
lenders. In an effort to resist the sort of tyranny by a self-interested
majority that occurred in the Serta restructuring, a group of more than
50% of the senior lenders “assembled in an effort to protect themselves
against further theft of their collateral.”218 Specifically, they entered into
a joint cooperation agreement promising to resist the proposed
transaction.219
To overcome this opposition, Revlon exercised its right under the
loan agreement to issue new, unfunded revolver commitments (later
described by senior lenders as “not real loans, just empty promises to
loan”)220:
[Revlon] took the position that these new “lenders” would then
be afforded the right to vote (even though they had no economic

Sale, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/15/revlon-stock-jumps-onreport-it-is-considering-a-sale.html [https://perma.cc/MYQ6-ZGLD].
213. Complaint at 4, UMB Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. Revlon, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-06352 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 12, 2020).
214. Id. at 5.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 49, 58.
217. Id. at 5.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 6.
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stake or standing to do so), thereby conjuring up a false majority
consent for the 2020 Transaction. These fake commitments
rigged the math: [Revlon] would issue the exact amount of
commitments necessary to inch over the 50.0% consent
threshold. The new revolver commitments served no legitimate
business purpose; rather, they were created solely to manipulate
and gerrymander voting on the Proposed Amendment so that
[Revlon] could consummate its scheme to siphon away
substantially all of the collateral from the 2016 Term Lenders.221
When the senior secured lenders decried the sham nature of the plan,
Revlon issued actual debt; of course, within days of its issuance, it
would be replaced by new loans. In other words, “[t]he revolving loans
were designed to vote against their own fake interest and to vanish only
days after being issued.”222 The plan worked, and the new debt issuances
allowed the amendments to pass “by less than half a percent.”223
The excluded lenders filed suit in August 2020, raising the same types
of claims made by lenders in the other case studies: namely, that the
transactions breached the express provisions of the loan agreement as
well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the
asset transfers constituted fraudulent transfers.224 But in a curious twist
of fate, the lenders’ claims were rendered moot when the administrative
agent accidentally paid all of the senior secured lenders in full.225 Upon
discovering the error, the agent issued notices to the lenders, informing
them that the payments were erroneously made and demanding return of
the funds. A majority of the lenders refused to return the funds, arguing
that the amounts paid constituted a valid discharge for value of the
debt.226 The agent then filed suit against them.227 The case went to trial
in December 2020228 and the court ruled in February 2021 that the

221. Id.
222. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
223. Id. (emphasis omitted).
224. Id.
225. For thoughtful commentary on the accidental payoff and the legal battle it inspired, see
Jonathan Macey, Schoolyard Justice in Federal Court, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2021, 12:54 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/schoolyard-justice-in-federal-court-11623171249
[https://perma.cc/C7SE-RVCM].
226. See id.
227. In re Citibank Aug. 11, 2020 Wire Transfers, 520 F. Supp. 3d 390, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
228. Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup Urges Return of Mistaken Revlon Payment as Trial Ends,
REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2020, 10:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/citigroup-urgesreturn-mistaken-revlon-payment-trial-ends-2020-12-16/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
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lenders were entitled to keep the sums they received.229 With the debt
extinguished, the excluded lenders’ lawsuit became irrelevant.
C.

Summary of Case Studies

The case studies show that the prevailing assumption that out-of-court
restructurings of senior loans are mostly collaborative and consensual is
no longer accurate. Nonconsensual restructuring transactions are
becoming a common feature of the capital markets. These transactions—
which I call “hostile restructurings”—are distinguishable from normal
out-of-court restructurings by their use of aggressive tactics to overcome
not only the traditional minority lender holdout problem, but also the
collective bargaining power of the entire lender group. In other words, in
hostile restructurings, the goal is not simply to cram a restructuring
down the throats of a self-interested or misguided minority holdout;
instead, the goal is to cram a plan down on the entire lender group,
pitting lenders against one another to achieve restructuring goals that
benefit the company’s other stakeholders.
For instance, companies negotiate with multiple lender groups in
tandem and in secret, even requiring them to promise not to speak to
their co-lenders about prospective deals. In essence, companies utilize a
“divide and conquer” strategy230 to dilute the traditional bargaining
power enjoyed by large senior lender groups.231 These tactics incentivize
individual lenders or factions to offer enough concessions to the debtor
to ensure their continued position at the top of the priority ladder. Where
syndicated lender groups have attempted to reclaim their collective
bargaining power and band together to defend against hostile
restructurings, at least one company has subverted the attempt by issuing
new debt to artificially manufacture the necessary majority.232
The benefits of hostile restructurings to companies, their other
stakeholders, and the markets more broadly are clear. Like all debt
restructurings, hostile restructurings help companies manage fastapproaching maturities, reduce interest expenses, and relax covenants.
229. In re Citibank, 520 F. Supp. 3d at 451.
230. For a fascinating discussion of “divide and conquer” as a negotiation strategy, see Larry
Crump, For the Sake of the Team: Unity and Disunity in a Multiparty Major League Baseball
Negotiation, 21 NEGOT. J. 317 (2005).
231. In a classic article exploring bond restructurings, Professor Brudney contrasted the
negotiation disadvantages faced by dispersed bondholders against the superior bargaining position
enjoyed by a hypothetical sole lender. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor
Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1831 (1992).
232. See supra notes 218–227 and accompanying text.
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Because they generally feature a debt-for-debt exchange in which
participating lenders agree to exchange their existing debt for new debt
at a discount, they help to deleverage troubled companies, in some cases
helping to preserve solvency and stave off bankruptcy.
These transactions also offer cash-strapped companies relatively
quick access to much-needed liquidity on an out-of-court basis. And, to
the extent they include additional borrowing capacity that may be used
for future debt buy-backs, transactions of this sort allow companies to
take advantage of lower market prices of their own debt as they continue
to deleverage. Finally, like all successful restructurings, hostile
restructurings have the potential to stabilize and preserve valuable and
productive business enterprises, advancing the interests of employees,
shareholders, and the countless suppliers, vendors, and other parties that
conduct business with the company.
Hostile restructurings may also enhance the overall efficiency of the
market for corporate debt restructuring. For instance, in a play on the
classic prisoner’s dilemma,233 if lenders are aware that companies
regularly pursue hostile restructurings that only benefit some lenders at
the expense of others, they may be more inclined to agree to a debtor’s
initial restructuring proposal in order to ensure that they are not on the
losing end of a hostile restructuring.234 In other words, the threat of
hostile restructurings may help to counterbalance the economic
incentives for lenders to collectively refuse to make concessions or
engage in strategic holdout behavior. A more competitive market for
out-of-court restructurings may, in turn, enhance firm value by allowing
firms to reconfigure their capital structure more quickly and efficiently
in distressed situations.
But hostile restructurings also introduce considerable uncertainty and,
accordingly, carry substantial litigation costs. Although the companies
promoting these transactions often claim that they do not technically
violate existing agreements, hostile restructurings tend to proceed under
strained interpretations of highly technical language, at the same time

233. Judge Easterbrook described the classic prisoners’ dilemma:
Two prisoners, unable to confer with one another, must decide whether to take the prosecutor’s
offer: confess, inculpate the other, and serve a year in jail, or keep silent and serve five years. If
the prisoners could make a (binding) bargain with each other, they would keep silent and both
would go free. But they can’t communicate, and each fears that the other will talk. So both
confess.
Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1989).
234. This is a spin on the classic argument that hostile takeovers enhance market efficiency
through a disciplinary effect. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
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implicating thorny and fact-intensive legal and equitable doctrines, such
as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraudulent
transfer laws. Despite these costs and uncertainties, aggrieved and
dissenting lenders have every incentive to engage in extensive litigation.
After all, hostile restructurings delve a harsh blow to excluded lenders,
who lose valuable collateral and/or their priority status on future
repayment.
And while these are the most obvious direct costs, there are also a
number of indirect costs. Hostile restructurings have the potential to
destroy value, impair the smooth functioning of the capital markets, and
introduce and amplify the distributional concerns that have traditionally
plagued bankruptcy restructurings. The following Part considers these
indirect costs, arguing that hostile restructurings constitute a normative
failure in the capital markets.
III. HOSTILE OUT-OF-COURT LOAN RESTRUCTURINGS AS A
NORMATIVE FAILURE
The previous Part highlighted some of the more immediate risks and
benefits of hostile restructurings. This Part takes a closer look,
concluding that the rise of hostile restructurings should be understood as
a normative failure in the U.S. capital markets.235 This is because these
transactions violate the most fundamental norms and values underlying
commercial law and practice. First, hostile restructurings threaten the
important goals of legal certainty and predictability in the capital
markets. Second, they violate classic and emerging theoretical
justifications for nonconsensual adjustments to loan agreements. Finally,
these transactions have the potential to interfere with the smooth
functioning of the capital markets, causing counterproductive outcomes
and other dangerous ripple effects. Moreover, these problems are
unlikely to self-correct; in fact, they are likely to become worse over
time.
A.

Hostile Restructurings Threaten Legal Certainty and Predictability
in the Capital Markets

Hostile restructurings threaten the important goals of legal certainty
and predictability in the capital markets by undermining investor
confidence in payment priority and lien rights.236 Priority—whether in
235. Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997).
236. The unique role of the lien—as opposed to other property rights and entitlements—in
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respect of payment or lien rights—is always a concern to lenders. But in
times of economic uncertainty and corporate financial distress, it is a far
more pressing concern. This is because in the event of a future
bankruptcy filing, distribution rights are typically determined in
accordance with absolute priority.237
Through private ordering, the grant of consensual liens, and the grant
of lien and payment priority, debtors exercise their rights “to prefer some
creditors over others.”238 Under the common law, these sorts of
preferences were viewed as a fraud on other creditors.239 As a classic
work explained, “When a debtor grants a security interest to one of his
creditors, he increases the riskiness of other creditors’ claims by
reducing their expected value in bankruptcy.”240 But modern commercial
law accepts these risks on the grounds that they are counterbalanced by
the voluntary nature of most commercial transactions: after all,
subsequent creditors have an opportunity to conduct due diligence and
identify prior liens. As Professors Jackson and Kronman explained:
“[T]hese other creditors will be aware of this risk and will insist on a
premium for lending on an unsecured basis, will demand collateral (or
some other protection) to secure their own claims, or will search for
another borrower whose enterprise is less risky.”241
Another classic work defended consensual liens based on a
“normative theory of security interests [that] is grounded upon the
normative theories that justify the institution of property. The right to
own private property is the essential bedrock of capitalism and an
essential component of a market economy.”242 In other words, a lien is
one of the many sticks in the proverbial bundle that represent rights in
private property, and owners are free to distribute those sticks as they
see fit. “[I]nsofar as any . . . adverse effects on existing and future
unsecured creditors are concerned, the transfer of a security interest does
modern corporate finance is richly explored in Ofer Eldar & Andrew Verstein, The Enduring
Distinction Between Business Entities and Security Interests, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 213 (2019).
237. See supra notes 70–71.
238. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147–48 (1979).
239. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 284 (Pa. 1819) (“The mortgage of a chattel
is a pledge; that to such pledge a delivery of the chattel is necessary, and that every such mortgage,
where the parties stand in the relation of debtor and creditor, unaccompanied with such possession
as the subject-matter is capable of, is fraudulent and void against all other creditors . . . .”).
240. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 238, at 1147.
241. Id. at 1148.
242. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2047–48 (1994).
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not differ fundamentally from other transfers of a property interest in
exchange for equivalent value.”243
Subsequent works have challenged these and other traditional
justifications for consensual liens, but almost entirely from the
perspective of unsecured creditors244 and involuntary creditors, such as
tort claimants and other lien creditors.245 But hostile restructurings do
not implicate these familiar concerns over the ability for unsecured
creditors to eventually collect from debtors that have granted consensual
liens to their other creditors. Instead, hostile restructurings raise a
different question: whether a company can prefer some of its existing
senior secured creditors over others. In other words, hostile
restructurings implicate questions of intra-class subordination among
creditors that were previously given the same stick to share.
Here, the law, customary practice, and economic realities all suggest
that this conduct should not be allowed. While debtor companies may
argue that hostile restructurings do not, as a technical matter, impair the
rights of the excluded lenders, they clearly change the economic
substance of the arrangement. And this may be all it takes to undermine
investor confidence in payment priority and lien rights. Changes to
payment priority impact a creditor’s relative position in the bankruptcy
distribution scheme, while new pari passu debt issuances dilute each
lender’s pro rata distribution. Moreover, claims in bankruptcy are treated
as secured only to the value of the collateral properly securing those
obligations.246 If the most valuable property has been transferred out of
the collateral pool, or if all of the collateral value is consumed by new,
higher-priority debt issuances, then the lenders’ claims will be
effectively relegated to unsecured status.247
Of course, some market participants would argue that these are
243. Id. at 2052.
244. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994).
245. See id.; see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9
Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997).
246. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a claim is treated as secured only “to the extent of the value of
such creditor’s interest” in the collateral, with the remainder of the creditor’s claim treated as
unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Alternatively, an undersecured creditor holding a valid lien on the
debtor’s property may elect to have its claim treated as fully secured by making an election under 11
U.S.C. § 1111(b).
247. The precarious position of junior, undersecured creditors was recently highlighted in In re
Consol. Bedding, Inc., No. 09-11875, 2021 WL 2638594 (Bankr. D. Del. June 25, 2021), which
reaffirmed a first lien creditor’s rights with respect to collateral shared with a subordinated second
lien creditor. Although the opinion focuses on provisions of an intercreditor agreement, the outcome
of the case—that the second lien creditor was not entitled to a distribution—drives home the
importance of priority, dilution, and collateral value. Id. at *5.
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acceptable risks for competitive transactions negotiated among
sophisticated parties.248 But as the following section explores, it is
difficult to imagine that lenders would, collectively, agree to hostile
restructurings as an effective solution to the traditional obstacles that
impede fair and efficient out-of-court restructurings.
B.

Hostile Restructurings Violate Theoretical Justifications for
Nonconsensual Restructurings

Hostile restructurings afford companies the power to unilaterally
impair lender rights and interests—in economic substance if not in legal
form—in ways that, if permissible at all, would only be permitted in
bankruptcy. In essence, these are mini cramdown plans. This may be
why proponents of hostile restructurings often justify their actions by
citing the broad policy goals of bankruptcy law.249
It may be helpful, then, to consider whether hostile restructurings
comply with classical and emergent theoretical justifications for
nonconsensual interventions in bankruptcy. Consider, for instance, the
traditional “Creditors’ Bargain” theoretical paradigm.250 Under this
model, bankruptcy laws—which naturally interfere with creditors’ state
law rights—are explained as satisfying a hypothetical ex ante
negotiation among all of a firm’s creditors. Although each would fare
better outside of bankruptcy if it could ensure its success in the
proverbial race to the courthouse, bankruptcy provides the next-best
alternative by promising a fair and efficient collective regime that
promises to treat similarly-situated creditors the same way.
More recently, Professor Casey has advanced a more nuanced
theoretical justification for bankruptcy laws: they “solve the incomplete
contracting problem that accompanies financial distress.”251 This “New
Bargaining Theory,” as Professor Casey refers to it,252 shifts attention
away from a purely hypothetical ex ante negotiation, focusing instead on

248. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
249. For instance, Serta defended its hostile restructuring on the grounds that it was the only way
to overcome the senior lenders’ superior bargaining position and restructure its financial obligations.
See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.
250. For a classic presentation of the creditors’ bargain theory, see Thomas H. Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862
(1982), which explains that bankruptcy processes help to offset the “strategic costs that would
otherwise be associated with a race to the courthouse”.
251. Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate
Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1709, 1711 (2020).
252. Id. at 1716.
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the actual “renegotiation framework” that chapter 11 provides. Viewed
in this light, chapter 11’s rules and structures are best understood as an
attempt to help parties overcome the impasses that naturally arise when
certain types of scarcity—such as highly complex and uncertain
situations of corporate financial distress—are governed by incomplete
contracts.
Hostile restructurings violate the norms and principles reflected in
both of these theoretical frameworks.253 It is difficult to imagine that
lenders would collectively agree, ex ante, to tactics of this sort as a way
to overcome their coordination problems and restructure their
obligations out of court. This is because, from the lenders’ collective
perspective, hostile restructurings are neither fair nor efficient. For one
thing, hostile restructurings allocate economic burdens to excluded
lenders with few, if any, legal safeguards. And, for reasons I describe
below, hostile restructurings are likely to cause the lender group to incur
additional monitoring and transaction costs—all for the privilege of
leaving value on the proverbial negotiation table.
And, while there is no clear evidence that senior lenders prefer the
off-the-rack renegotiation framework offered under chapter 11, there is
at least some evidence of the restructuring process syndicated lenders
would prefer. Such evidence can be found in the voluntary norms and
standards that have been adopted in the industry. For instance, the
nonbinding LSTA Procedures for Credit Agreement Modifications (the
“LSTA Procedures”),254 developed by a working group consisting of
representatives from the largest agent banks, provide voluntary standards
for out-of-court syndicated loan restructurings.255 The LSTA Procedures
detail a process in which restructuring proposals are channeled through
the administrative agent, who then disseminates the information to all
lenders—both in written form and by coordinating conference calls with
the company—so that each lender may decide whether to consent.256
253. While the law and economics paradigm continues to prevail in modern bankruptcy law,
other theoretical paradigms ultimately identify similar principles of bankruptcy. For instance, legal
philosophy suggests that a system of corporate insolvency law should promote justice, fairness,
liberty, equality, and reasonableness. See RIZWAAN JAMEEL MOKAL, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW: THEORY AND APPLICATION 2–10 (2005); see also SARAH PATERSON, CORPORATE
REORGANISATION LAW AND FORCES OF CHANGE (2020); JANIS PEARL SARRA, CREDITOR RIGHTS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: RESTRUCTURING INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS (2003).
254. Exhibit H, Octagon Credit Invs., LLC v. NYDJ Apparel, LLC, No. 656677/2017 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 1, 2017) (providing a copy of the LSTA Procedures for Credit Agreement Modifications).
255. On the history and purpose of the working group, see generally Working Out Syndication
Ground Rules, AM. BANKER (Nov. 8, 2001, 2:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/wor
king-out-syndication-ground-rules (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
256. See Exhibit H, supra note 254.
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Similar nonbinding, norms-based debt restructuring principles have been
advanced by other market participants and industry associations around
the world; these principles similarly emphasize the sharing of
information with all creditors and the existence of an intracreditor
governance structure that advances the interests of the creditors
collectively.257
Instead of following procedures of this sort, hostile restructurings
exploit existing agency problems among syndicated lenders, leading to
further breakdowns in governance and increased economic burdens. As
discussed above, most modern syndicated loan agreements are designed
to overcome the holdout problem by allowing restructurings to take
place with less-than-unanimous consent. Implicit in this design is an
assumption that the majority will exercise consent rights in the best
interests of all lenders—and not simply to enhance its own self-interests
at the expense of the minority. Unfortunately, there is often no clear
legal or contractual obligation to act in the best interests of the entire
group and, as the case studies reveal, companies use these agency
problems to their own advantage.
While hostile restructurings may admittedly delay or even prevent
liquidations, they also impose increased monitoring costs on lender
groups, as each lender must do its own redundant monitoring to ensure
that it does not find itself on the losing end of a hostile restructuring. The
ensuing lender arms race manifests ex ante as more contentious loan
negotiations and defensive draftsmanship, and ex post as further
fractionalization and self-protective posturing in restructuring
negotiations. These dynamics, in turn, threaten the overall fairness and
efficiency of all restructuring processes—whether within or outside of
court—that have come to rely on collaboration and consensus. For
instance, recent chapter 11 cases have featured minority lender ad hoc
groups formed by minority lenders to oppose restructuring decisions that
they believe advance the interests of other stakeholders—including their
co-lenders—at their expense.258 And, as the following section explains,
the costs do not end with the parties directly impacted by these
transactions.

257. See JOSE M. GARRIDO, WORLD BANK, OUT-OF-COURT DEBT RESTRUCTURING 39–47 (2012)
(discussing the so-called “London Approach” and the INSOL Principles—two prominent examples
of nonbinding, norms-based debt restructuring principles).
258. See sources cited supra note 19.
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Hostile Restructurings May Cause Dangerous Ripple Effects in the
Capital Markets

Hostile restructurings also have the potential to cause
counterproductive outcomes and other inefficiencies in the capital
markets. Because corporate shareholders and managers often prefer to
restructure rather than liquidate, powerful lender groups have
traditionally served as a check on the impulse to engage in economically
irrational restructurings.259 But hostile restructurings override this
protective mechanism by interjecting new incentives for lenders to
engage in restructurings simply to defend themselves. This makes them
more likely to agree to restructurings that are not otherwise
economically justified.
Hostile restructurings are also likely to cause a “race for the
bottom”260 in the market for debt restructurings. With lenders highly
incentivized to do whatever it takes to ensure that they receive the
concentrated economic benefits offered only to participating lenders,
they are forced to essentially negotiate against themselves. There is little
incentive to evaluate the entire consideration paid to all of the senior
lenders collectively. This can lead to a situation where the lenders,
collectively, leave value on the proverbial negotiation table, allowing it
to flow down to junior stakeholders in a way that would violate absolute
priority in a bankruptcy setting. Indeed, this is likely a primary
motivation for engaging in hostile restructurings.
And the ripple effects extend far beyond the debt markets. Elsewhere
in the financial markets, hostile restructurings can have a dangerous
signaling effect.261 Loan restructurings—like all major corporate
259. Corporate decision-making in times of corporate financial distress has been the subject of
considerable attention by the Delaware Court of Chancery. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)
(establishing that directors and officers of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent or in the “zone”
of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to stockholders and creditors).
260. The phrase has been used to describe a variety of phenomena in commercial and corporate
law. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (using the phrase to explain the prominence of Delaware corporate law).
261. The role of monitoring and signaling in commercial law has been explored extensively in the
literature. See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49 (1982), for a classic discussion exploring the role of secured creditors in monitoring
the firm), and Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–14 (1981), which questions the then-prevailing view that junior
creditors monitor. More recently, Professors Jacoby and Janger question the applicability of this
monitoring theory to modern corporate restructurings, where senior secured creditors purport to
have liens in all of the debtor’s assets. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward Janger, Tracing Equity:
Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 717–19 (2018).
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recapitalizations—are often publicized in a positive light, with reference
to newly invested capital and the establishment of new debt facilities. A
press release of this sort may be construed by other market participants
as a sign that the senior lenders—who arguably enjoy an information
advantage relative to other stakeholders—believe that the company is
worth restructuring because it has greater value as a going concern.262
This signaling effect is most likely to influence new or existing junior
stakeholders, such as shareholders and trade creditors.
In reality, the very transactions that junior stakeholders may interpret
as restructurings to preserve going concern value may actually be
disguised liquidations by the most senior and well-informed
stakeholders, who trade their existing senior position in the firm for an
equally263 senior position in which the economic benefits are
concentrated among fewer lenders. The senior lenders do this because
they fear—or perhaps even know—that in a hypothetical liquidation
there would not be enough value to allow all of the lenders to enjoy the
economic benefits of the senior position. When viewed in this light, the
entire hostile restructuring transaction—including any new capital
invested into the firm—is properly understood as an attempt to shore up
the participating lenders’ liquidation preference in exchange for allowing
other stakeholders to siphon value away from their unwitting colenders.264 While hostile restructurings may help the firm to avoid
liquidation and enhance its value as a going concern, this benefit may be
incidental to the true, self-interested motives of controlling stakeholders
and participating lenders.
For all of these reasons, the rise of hostile restructurings should be
understood as a normative failure in the U.S. capital markets that will
likely continue and grow worse over time. The following Part considers
the various legal or regulatory interventions that may be used to address
the problem.

262. Signaling of this sort is studied in Christophe J. Godlewski, The Certification Value of
Private Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts: Empirical Evidence from
Europe, 53 J. BANKING & FIN. 1–17 (2015).
263. Here, I mean that participating lenders were previously in a senior secured, first-priority
position. After a hostile restructuring, they are also in a senior secured, first-priority position. Thus,
while their position has changed relative to the excluded lenders, they continue to enjoy the most
senior position in the firm’s capital structure.
264. These dynamics are explored in Ellias & Stark, supra note 28.
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IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL AND REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS
TO CORRECT THE NORMATIVE FAILURE
How can the legal or regulatory system respond to and help correct
the normative failure of hostile restructurings? This Part considers
various possible solutions, ranging from a purely private ordering
response to more top-down statutory or regulatory interventions.
Ultimately, I settle on a recommendation that courts should provide a
more holistic, standards-based review of hostile restructurings. Although
this solution is likely to impose substantial economic burdens in the
short-run, in the form of increased litigation costs and greater legal
uncertainty, it will eventually provide a roadmap that parties may
voluntarily apply to their out-of-court restructuring transactions in order
to avoid judicial scrutiny. But before describing the ideal form of
judicial intervention, it is important to consider other alternative legal
responses. The following section explores the most direct solution:
enhanced private ordering.
A.

Private Ordering

Hostile restructurings may be entirely prevented—or at least
dramatically curtailed—by private ordering. In fact, some have argued
that lax private ordering—specifically, the recent trend towards so-called
“cov-lite” loan agreements—is to blame for hostile restructurings in the
first place.265 If this is true, then parties to syndicated loan agreements
may be able to restrict companies from engaging in hostile restructurings
simply by including strict covenants and other provisions that explicitly
forbid conduct of this sort.
For instance, syndicated lender groups can insist, ex ante, on
provisions that would prevent debtors from engaging in uptiering and
drop-down transactions. Helpful provisions would include covenants
that prohibit lien and payment subordination and non-pro-rata open
market purchases,266 language imposing tighter restrictions on
transactions involving the collateral and/or any unrestricted
subsidiaries,267 limitations on new debt issuances,268 and provisions
265. See, e.g., Victoria Ivashina & Boris Vallee, Weak Credit Covenants 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27316, 2020) (analyzing a large sample of modern credit agreements,
focusing on provisions that weaken important covenants).
266. These are examples of so-called negative covenants, which are richly explored in Carl S.
Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999).
267. The need for enhanced clarity around transactions of this sort is explored in Brad Cheek,
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requiring that all lenders have an opportunity to participate in any
priming facilities.
To some extent, this sort of defensive drafting is already taking place
in the industry.269 The problem, however, is that savvy debtor companies
and their advisors may continue to design new hostile restructurings that
exploit other hypertechnical provisions in their loan agreements. And,
given the high stakes involved, all parties to these transactions have
incentives to advance novel interpretations of even the most standard
contract terms. Indeed, one need only to look to the sovereign bond
market for a cautionary tale: conflicting interpretations of pari passu
clauses have generated extensive litigation, grinding restructurings to a
halt while courts struggle to understand each side’s rights and
obligations under the agreement.270 Acknowledging these and other
practical realities, several commentators have recently expressed
skepticism regarding lenders’ ability to close all of the loopholes that
may be lurking in their agreements.271
Another option would be for parties to include more sweeping
provisions, such as unanimous or near-unanimous consent requirements
or prohibitions against debtor companies negotiating directly with
individual lenders or lender factions. In a similar way, syndicated lender
groups could enter into side agreements, ex post, affirming their
commitment to pro rata sharing of economic benefits and collective
action that benefits all similarly situated lenders.
Tearin’ Up iHeart: The Recent Trend with Troubled Companies and the Unrestricted Subsidiary
Transfer Tactic, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 271 (2019).
268. For an example of this type of negative covenant, see Committee on Trust Indentures and
Indenture Trustees, Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 BUS. LAW. 1439,
1500–01 (2006).
269. See, e.g., Yoruk Bahceli, The Devil’s in The Detail for Junk Debt Investors Facing
Coronavirus
Defaults,
REUTERS
(Apr.
29,
2020,
10:41
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN22C0OK [https://perma.cc/L5KH-E9G9] (describing the
“J Crew blocker” provisions).
270. For a thorough discussion, see Natalie A. Turchi, Note, Restructuring A Sovereign Bond
Pari Passu Work-Around: Can Holdout Creditors Ever Have Equal Treatment?, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2171 (2015).
271. See Ellias & Stark, supra note 28, at 787 (“The lawyers who represent large firms are simply
too skilled in the perpetual cat-and-mouse game not to find loopholes and ways around even the
best contractual language.”); see also COVID-19: Prime Time for Priming, O’MELVENY & MYERS
LLP (July 15, 2020), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/covid-19prime-time-for-priming/ [https://perma.cc/W6TQ-Z346] (opining that lenders may never be able to
close up all of the loopholes); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole
Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 72 (2017) (exploring, with respect to bond
indenture agreements, the broader tendency for stakeholders to scrutinize agreements for terms that
others may have overlooked or mispriced).
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But both types of agreements would be difficult to monitor and
enforce and would likely make out-of-court restructurings far more
difficult. Relatedly, there is a real danger that loan agreements could
become “hyperrigid,” driving more companies into bankruptcy and
leading to spillover effects in the capital markets.272 The following
section swings to the other end of the proverbial pendulum, considering
a top-down solution in the form of regulatory or statutory intervention.
B.

Regulatory or Statutory Interventions

The problem of hostile restructurings is not a new phenomenon in the
U.S. capital markets. In fact, many aspects of these transactions are
reminiscent of problems that have plagued out-of-court restructurings in
the public bond markets. In the first half of last century, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) focused its attention on
corporate reorganizations conducted pursuant to collective action clauses
in bond indentures. After surveying high-profile cases, the SEC found
that these restructurings featured numerous “abuses and problems.”273
Notably, the SEC was concerned that controlling stakeholders were
initiating bond restructurings in order to allocate the firm’s economic
burdens to the bondholders.274 The concern may have also stemmed
from stories of abusive restructurings under the equity receivership
model used to restructure railroads prior to the enactment of a corporate
bankruptcy reorganization statute.275
In order to prevent abusive out-of-court bond restructurings, the SEC
proposed, and Congress enacted, section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture
Act (“TIA”).276 This section prohibits amendments to bond indentures
that purport to bind nonconsenting bondholders to a reduction in their
right to receive payment.277 The language effectively forecloses out-ofcourt bond restructurings that reduce the amount of principal outstanding

272. For an in-depth look at the problem of hyperrigid securitization agreements, see Anna
Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2009).
273. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES, PART VI at 150 (1936).
274. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 250–52
(1987).
275. Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1420 (2004).
276. Pub. L. No 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149, 1173 (1939) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp).
277. See id.
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or the interest rate applicable to the debt.278
The existence of section 316(b), and the history that led to its
enactment, provides important precedent for a similar type of top-down
regulatory or statutory response to hostile loan restructurings. But
drafting a statute or regulation of this sort would be difficult. A rule
modeled after section 316(b) would fail to capture many types of hostile
restructurings, as these transactions do not always technically impair
payment rights; instead, these transactions tend to impact the economic
substance of payment priority and lien rights. It would be difficult to
develop a standard that would fully capture all potential forms of hostile
restructurings without going too far and essentially foreclosing the
possibility of out-of-court loan restructurings.
And, even if such a rule could be designed to be comprehensive
without being overbroad, syndicated loan notes are not traditionally
viewed as securities, and so there is not currently a regulatory
infrastructure in place to monitor and enforce compliance with such a
provision in the syndicated loan market. Finally, the benefits of
section 316(b) in the parallel world of bond restructurings are hotly
disputed in the academic literature.279 Such thorough and well-reasoned
critiques not only call into question the wisdom of adopting a similar
rule for loan restructurings; they would also make it practically
impossible to pass such a measure.
But while syndicated loans are not traditionally subject to any
specialized legal or regulatory regime, they are subject to the laws
generally, including state contract law. And disputes arising under these
agreements are subject to the jurisdiction of state and federal courts.
Accordingly, the following section considers the possibility of a judicial
solution to the problem of hostile restructurings.
C.

Judicial Intervention

Given the challenges and limitations associated with a pure private
ordering solution, on the one hand, and a top-down statutory or
regulatory response, on the other, the best solution is for courts to
provide a more holistic, standards-based review of hostile restructurings.
278. For a thorough discussion of the mechanics of section 316(b), see Bratton & Levitin, supra
note 44, at 1615–18.
279. See, e.g., Bratton & Levitin, supra note 44, at 1602 (arguing for repeal); Harold B.
Groendyke, Note, A Renewed Need for Collective Action: The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 and Outof-Court Restructurings, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2016) (arguing for “a new Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rule that requires all out-of-court restructurings with bondholders to
be negotiated by an uncoerced majority vote”).
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In this regard, I join a chorus of corporate and commercial law scholars
who have made recent calls for greater judicial involvement in
commercial finance disputes. For instance, scholars have called for
greater judicial scrutiny of corporate decision-making in times of
financial distress in order to counterbalance the moral hazards that lead
managers to favor some stakeholders at the expense of others.280 Others
have argued that, in the case of out-of-court bond debt restructurings,
section 316(b) should be repealed in favor of the renewed application of
a “long forgotten, but still valid, equity doctrine of intercreditor good
faith duties.”281
Judicial intervention in hostile restructurings can take many forms. It
can be as simple as a renewed emphasis on existing legal and equitable
principles, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Or it can be as complex as courts superimposing a formal restructuring
regime based on the Bankruptcy Code—or any other modern or
historical insolvency regime, for that matter.
As one example of the latter type of intervention, courts could subject
hostile restructurings to something like the chapter 11 plan confirmation
standards. In lawsuits brought by excluded lenders alleging that a
restructuring is an unlawful hostile restructuring, debtor companies
could be required to defend the restructuring and establish its lawfulness
by making a showing that it did not unfairly discriminate against the
excluded lenders and that it treated them fairly and equitably. In
developing suitable standards, it would be assumed that courts would
borrow heavily from bankruptcy law; corporate law’s entire fairness
standard would also provide a useful corollary.282 Then, depending on
the nature of the allegations raised by the excluded lenders, the court
may import other, finer rules and principles of bankruptcy and corporate
law. For instance, in cases involving allegations of consent
gerrymandering, courts could draw from bankruptcy jurisprudence on
so-called class gerrymandering used by some debtors to manufacture an
accepting impaired class in chapter 11.283
But this type of judicial intervention suffers from some obvious

280. See Ellias & Stark, supra note 28.
281. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 44, at 1602.
282. There is some Delaware precedent for applying the entire fairness standard to corporate
finance transactions. See IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742, 2017 WL 7053964,
at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (finding that a recapitalization was a “conflicted controller
transaction” that invoked entire fairness review).
283. Class gerrymandering in bankruptcy is explored in In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995
F.2d 1274, 1279–80 (5th Cir. 1991).
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drawbacks. For one thing, this process would undermine the very notion
of an “out-of-court” restructuring, as debtor companies must be prepared
to make a showing that their allegedly hostile restructuring satisfies the
requisite judicial standard. In practice, this means that all out-of-court
restructurings that feature some interlender conflict would essentially be
subject to the same legal hurdles as prepackaged bankruptcies—albeit
with expanded opportunities for corporate stakeholders to forum shop
across both federal and state courts.284 This would increase costs and
legal uncertainty considerably.
As one potential solution, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy
Code to provide a streamlined process for reviewing and approving
hostile restructurings, much like the recent chapter 16 proposals for bond
restructurings.285 But without some sort of clear statutory prohibition on
hostile restructurings (such that all parties understand that they must
submit to the streamlined bankruptcy proceeding in order to move
forward), any such proceeding would likely be marred by disputes
grounded in state contract law. For instance, disputes would likely center
on the question of whether a proposed restructuring is in fact a hostile
restructuring that ought to be conducted through the streamlined
bankruptcy proceeding, or whether it is simply a garden-variety exercise
of rights clearly set forth in the underlying loan agreement. Similar to
the eligibility battles that often accompany chapter 9 bankruptcy filings,
these disputes have the potential to spill across several forums, driving
up costs and introducing new forms of legal uncertainty.
The better solution, then, is for all courts to approach disputes arising
out of loan restructurings with a renewed emphasis on existing legal and
equitable principles, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. As discussed above, under basic principles of state contract law,
the implied covenant is generally understood to mean that parties to
contracts should behave honestly and work to uphold the spirit of the
agreement.286 Parties to contracts should not, for instance, undermine the
284. Much ink has been spilled on the current problem of forum shopping in bankruptcy. See
generally, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2015)
(critiquing the practice of forum shopping and proposing procedural solutions); LYNN M. LOPUCKI,
COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY
COURTS (2005) (asserting that forum shopping has caused bankruptcy judges to compete with one
another for large cases, to the detriment of the bankruptcy system and most stakeholders).
285. Chapter 16 proposals are described in Mark J. Roe, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in
Congress and the Courts in 2016: Bringing the SEC to the Table, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 360, 374
(2016).
286. See, e.g., 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co., 773 N.E.2d 496, 500 (N.Y.
2002) (explaining that the “covenant embraces a pledge that ‘neither party shall do anything which
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
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rights of their counterparties to receive the benefits of the bargain.
Under New York law—which governs most large syndicated bank
loan agreements—the implied covenant is breached “when a party acts
in a manner that would deprive the other party of the right to receive the
benefits of their agreement.”287 The implied covenant encompasses those
“promises which a reasonable promisee would be justified in
understanding were included.”288 Moreover, “[a] party may be in breach
of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing even if it is not in
breach of its express contractual obligations” to the extent such party’s
actions “destroy or injure the right of another party to receive the
benefits of the contract.”289
Of course, the courts hearing disputes arising out of hostile
restructurings have always had the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing at their disposal. Indeed, it was raised by plaintiffs in cases
profiled in this Article, and it inspired one court to deny a motion to
dismiss.290 The problem is that in order to reach a decision on the merits,
the implied covenant demands a deeply contextual review, taking into
account all of the facts and circumstances of the case.291 But the courts
hearing commercial finance disputes do so in the shadow of decades of
precedent establishing that courts should not interfere with the smooth
functioning of the capital markets by applying thorny judicial doctrines
or, worse yet, interposing new judge-made law.292 Instead, in the name
of preserving legal certainty, predictability, and uniformity and ensuring
the smooth functioning of the credit markets, courts should simply
enforce the plain language of the agreement and otherwise stay out of
the dispute.293
For courts already so inclined to abstain in the name of certainty,
predictability, and uniformity, the implied covenant provides a ready
doctrinal out: case law establishes that the implied covenant should not

contract’” (quoting Dalton v. Educ. Testing Serv., 663 N.E.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. 1995))).
287. 1357 Tarrytown Rd. Auto, LLC v. Granite Properties, LLC, 37 N.Y.S.3d 341, 343 (App.
Div. 2016).
288. Id.
289. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Keystone Distribs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 808, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
290. See supra section II.A; Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 158.
291. “[A]s Delaware judges, lawyers, and scholars alike have all acknowledged, the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an inherently contextual, standards-based, and,
therefore, indeterminate doctrine.” Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A
Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 246 (2011).
292. See generally Dick, supra note 14.
293. See id.
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be used to contradict the express provisions of the agreement.294 For
instance, courts have found that there is no violation of the implied
covenant where the agreement unambiguously affords a party the right
to take some action or exercise some discretion.295
With respect to hostile restructurings, then, the first challenge is
overcoming courts’ own reluctance to engage in a deep contextual
review. Then, the second challenge is overcoming the argument that
each and every step taken in the restructuring was technically in
compliance with the plain language of the loan agreement. With respect
to the first challenge, although it is true that heightened judicial scrutiny
would introduce new forms of legal uncertainty into the capital markets,
this risk is outweighed by the benefits of correcting the normative failure
of hostile restructurings. For all of the reasons provided in Part III,
hostile restructurings themselves have the potential to cause dangerous
ripple effects. Accordingly, legal intervention is in fact needed to
preserve and protect legal certainty and the smooth functioning of the
capital markets.
Regarding the second challenge, there are two ways courts can move
beyond arguments that the transactions are protected from scrutiny
because they technically comply with the express provisions of the
agreement. First, courts can take a page from tax and corporate law and
apply a “step-transaction approach” that treats multiple transactions that
occur contemporaneously as one transaction.296 This would allow for a
more expansive inquiry that focuses judicial attention on the overall
economic effect of a string of transactions rather than the technical
permissibility of each individual step.297 In a similar way, courts can
294. 767 Third Ave. LLC v. Greble & Finger, LLP, 778 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (App. Div. 2004).
295. See, e.g., ELBT Realty, LLC v. Mineola Garden City Co., 42 N.Y.S.3d 304, 304 (App. Div.
2016) (explaining that the implied covenant should not be used to override an express provision in a
contract stating “that the purchaser could terminate the contract in ‘its sole discretion’ and for ‘any
reason whatsoever’”); Moran v. Erk, 901 N.E.2d 187, 192 (N.Y. 2008) (interpreting an attorney
approval contingency clause according to its plain meaning); Nat’l Westminster Bank, U.S.A. v.
Ross, 130 B.R. 656, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining “to imply an obligation of good faith
inconsistent with other express terms of the parties contractual relationship”).
296. The doctrine can be traced to the classic tax case, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935). In Gregory, the Court criticized the practice of “exalt[ing] artifice above reality,” instead
urging courts to “fix[] the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred.” Id. at 469–70.
This focus on the bigger picture revealed the transactions at issue to be “an elaborate and devious
form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else.” Id. at 470; see
also Am. Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 202–05 (Cl. Ct. 1968) (further
describing the step-transaction doctrine in modern tax law).
297. There is some modern precedent for applying the step-transaction doctrine to commercial
finance agreements. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1050–52 (2d
Cir. 1982) (suggesting, in the way it analyzed whether an issuer had sold “substantially all” of its
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engage in more holistic reviews that consider whether the hostile
restructuring, as a whole, violates the plain language and spirit of the
original loan agreement. Indeed, hostile restructurings are likely to
violate the plain language and spirit of senior secured loan agreements
that reflect both a collective design298 and an intent to share ratably the
economic risks and benefits.
Here, the focus should be on whether, taking into account the overall
effect of the restructuring, existing creditors have been treated fairly and
equitably—not simply whether they are ultimately afforded equal
treatment.299 Courts may develop a list of factors to evaluate the fairness
of a particular restructuring proposal. For instance, courts should closely
examine the exclusive nature of the restructuring proposal: a proposal
that is offered to all or substantially all of the existing lenders is less
likely to constitute a hostile restructuring; in contrast, courts should be
more suspicious of proposals that are only offered to the number of
lenders necessary to overcome applicable consent thresholds. Similarly,
courts should consider the level of participation by existing lenders: a
proposal—particularly one that was offered to all or substantially all of
the lenders—is unlikely to constitute a hostile restructuring if it has
garnered the support of an overwhelming majority of the existing
lenders.
Secrecy, as well as efforts by the proposal sponsor to “divide and
conquer” the lender group, are also important factors to consider. A
proposal is more likely to constitute a hostile restructuring when it is the
product of negotiations with lenders who promise to keep information
concerning the proposal away from other lenders. In contrast, proposals
that are directed to the administrative agent for simultaneous distribution
to all lenders are unlikely to constitute hostile restructurings, even if they
contain aggressive terms. Finally, attempts by the debtor company to
manufacture or “gerrymander” consent—such as by issuing new debt or
debt commitments on the eve of solicitation—are highly indicative of a
hostile restructuring.
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that any form of heightened
judicial scrutiny will naturally impose substantial economic burdens in
the short run, in the form of increased litigation costs and greater legal
assets, that a series of transactions can be considered as a collective whole).
298. For a classic case finding that corporate debt agreements evidence a collective design, see
Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 865 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 2007).
299. Equality among creditors, as Professor Skeel argues, is a rather meaningless virtue in
modern bankruptcy law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 699 (2018).
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uncertainty. But after several high-profile cases, companies, their
stakeholders, and their advisors would have a template to follow in
designing fair and efficient out-of-court restructuring transactions that
avoid judicial scrutiny altogether.300 And over time, voluntary
practices—such as the solicitation of fairness opinions to assess hostile
restructuring transactions—may evolve to help parties focus on the
economic substance of the transaction and potentially even iron out their
disputes at an earlier stage in the process. In this way, judicial
intervention has the potential to provide a uniquely fair, efficient, and
targeted solution to the new and burgeoning problem of hostile
restructurings.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. capital markets increasingly feature what I call “hostile
restructurings”: out-of-court syndicated loan restructuring transactions
that rely on aggressive negotiation tactics to overcome not only the
traditional lender holdout problem, but also the collective bargaining
power of the entire lender group. These transactions require corrective
intervention, ideally by the courts. But to answer this call to service,
courts must overcome decades of precedent establishing that judges
should not interfere with the smooth functioning of the capital markets
by applying thorny judicial doctrines to commercial finance disputes or,
worse yet, by interposing new judge-made law. By showcasing the many
ways in which hostile restructurings constitute a normative failure in the
capital markets, this Article provides both the call to action and the
theoretical justification for a fair, efficient, and effective form of judicial
intervention that can help to restore the smooth functioning of the capital
markets.

300. Professor Skeel similarly argues that a few high-profile cases have the potential to help
clarify legal standards, reducing the need for future litigation. Skeel, supra note 62, at 377.

